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1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.1995/SR.1
18 April 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

1995 REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 1st MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Monday, 17 April 1995, at 3 p.m.

Acting President: Mr. PATOKALLIO (Finland)

President: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)

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(a) APPOINTMENT OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE

CONFIRMATION OF THE NOMINATION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA

The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE FOURTH SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE

1. The ACTING PRESIDENT declared open the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), convened pursuant to article VIII, paragraph 3, and article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, and General Assembly resolution 47/52 A.

2. The Conference was charged with the dual task of reviewing the Treaty's operation and deciding on its extension. Both tasks were of great significance to the strengthening of international peace and security. With regard to the latter task, the Conference had a responsibility not only towards the current generation but towards generations to come.

3. Following the practice of past review conferences on the Treaty, he formally introduced the final report of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.1995/1), adopted on 27 January 1995. The Committee had held four sessions during the period from May 1993 to January 1995, and 154 States parties to the Treaty had participated in the work of one or more sessions. That represented an increase of 48 States parties as compared to the number that had taken part in the preparatory phase of the Fourth Review Conference.

4. In order to finalize the draft rules of procedure for the Conference, it had been agreed that the Chairman of the informal working group on the rules of procedure would hold further informal consultations. Agreement had been reached in the consultations to increase the number of Vice-Presidents of the Conference from 26 to 34, on the understanding that that did not constitute a precedent. Accordingly, rules 5 and 8 of the provisional rules of procedure had to be revised. With regard to rule 28.3, the one rule on which consensus had not yet been reached, the informal working group had been able to clarify a number of issues; however, a few issues required further consultation before the rule could be finalized. He believed that there was general agreement that the Conference should decide to apply the rules of procedure provisionally, pending their formal adoption, and that the President of the Conference should be asked to continue to search for consensus on the one outstanding point in rule 28.3 (f) and report back to the Conference no later than 10 a.m. on Wednesday, 26 April.

ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE

5. The ACTING PRESIDENT said that, at its second session in January 1994, the Preparatory Committee had decided to recommend to the 1995 Review and Extension Conference the election of Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka) as President.

6. Mr. Dhanapala (Sri Lanka) was elected President of the Conference by acclamation.

7. Mr. Dhanapala (Sri Lanka) took the Chair.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE

8. The PRESIDENT read out a message from the President of Sri Lanka and paid tribute to all those who, within and outside the Governments of States parties, had worked over the past 25 years to strengthen the Treaty in various ways and enlarge the number of its adherents to 178; that was almost 96 per cent of all the States Members of the United Nations. He welcomed the new parties to the Treaty, in particular South Africa, and acknowledged the invaluable support of the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

9. With the end of the cold war, the world had hoped for an era of collective security and the genuine fulfilment of the objectives and the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. It had seen instead the outbreak of the Gulf War, fighting in the Balkans and the continuation of fratricidal conflict in different parts of the world.

10. The maintenance of peace and security had become more complex than ever before. Military threats were linked to non-military aspects of security. Subnational and transnational groups, and even individuals, had acquired the power to destabilize the world. Destabilization of global peace and national and international security had assumed many unconventional forms that emanated from diverse sources.

11. The threat of weapons of mass destruction remained the paramount danger to the existence of humankind. While nuclear weapons, the use of which had brought unprecedented death and destruction at the end of the Second World War, remained at large, their horizontal proliferation had been held in check by the legal norm established by the non-proliferation Treaty. The Conference provided an opportunity to consolidate that norm and extend it; that would be a statement against the possession and use of nuclear weapons for all States for all time. The declaration of four nuclear-weapon States in the Conference on Disarmament on 6 April 1995, together with China's known policy, could provide a basis on which to work.

12. In recent years, there had been substantial progress in nuclear disarmament. For the first time in history, the capping of the nuclear arms race had been followed by the actual dismantling of nuclear missiles. The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), the Treaty between those countries on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-I) and the Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-II) were important milestones on a journey that must end with total nuclear disarmament. The comprehensive test ban treaty and a treaty to halt the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes would be negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) was a step forward in providing security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

13. As the world entered the twenty-first century, the focus on halting the spread of nuclear weapons that lay at the heart of the Treaty must extend logically to cover the future of nuclear weapons. Fresh challenges, including

nuclear smuggling and the breakup of nuclear-weapon States must also be faced. It was essential to be absolutely clear about the objective of nuclear disarmament, and that clarity of purpose must pervade the Conference's deliberations so that its decision to extend the Treaty was seen in its true perspective - as a consolidation of the gains on the road to the outlawing of the most horrendous weapon so far invented by humankind.

14. Mr. CHRISTOPHER (United States of America) welcomed the participants in the Conference on behalf of the host country. Few agreements had better embodied the principles that had guided the United Nations since its creation. The collective force of the Treaty had been a shining example of what nations could do to maintain international peace and security.

15. The non-proliferation Treaty was truly one of the most important treaties of all time. While many of its achievements - the weapons not built, the nuclear materials not diverted and the wars not started - could not be quantified, the results were none the less impressive. Since its entry into force, the Treaty had kept the number of nuclear Powers far lower than had initially been predicted. It had given the parties confidence in the nuclear intentions of other nations and had reduced the risk of nuclear conflict. It had advanced nuclear disarmament, bolstered regional security, promoted the safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy and underpinned the international community's efforts to halt the spread of all weapons of mass destruction.

16. By its purpose and its strength, the Treaty had earned the widest adherence of any international arms control agreement in history. It had protected the security of both nuclear and non-nuclear States. The international community had taken important steps to diminish the nuclear threat, and the number of nuclear-weapon-free zones was growing. The nuclear arsenals of the two former cold-war adversaries were being reduced by almost two thirds, and negotiations were advancing on a comprehensive test ban treaty and the cut-off of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

17. The purpose of the Treaty was to preserve the security of all, not the nuclear weapons monopoly of a few. The nuclear-weapon States had committed themselves to pursue negotiations towards the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. The Treaty was the basis for assurances to non-nuclear treaty partners that their security interests continued to be served by the wise and far-sighted choice that they had made to become parties to the Treaty.

18. The security that the Treaty helped to provide must be constantly reinforced. While the prospect of global nuclear war was receding, the prospect of the spread of nuclear weapons remained. Together, the members of the international community shared the responsibility to meet that common threat.

19. Mr. IBRAHIM (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries that were parties to the Treaty, said that the non-aligned countries attached great importance to the Conference, which presented a unique opportunity to assess the performance of the Treaty during the past 25 years and to strengthen the regime in all its aspects with a view to achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons, promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy and ensuring universal adherence to the Treaty. In that regard,

the Conference would decide on the extension of the Treaty based on the careful examination and realistic assessment of the obligations and responsibilities undertaken by all the parties to that instrument. The non-aligned countries participating in the Conference would spare no effort in cooperating with the President and with all delegations with a view to ensuring the success of the Conference.

20. Mr. GORITA (Romania), speaking on behalf of the Eastern European Group of States Parties to the Treaty, said that the attention of the entire international community was focused on the Conference, and its outcome would be of particular relevance for international stability, peace and security. He paid tribute to all those who had played a key role in the positive outcome of the preparatory process, especially the Chairmen of the Preparatory Committee at its four sessions. The Eastern European Group shared the optimism of the Secretary of State of the United States and hoped that his hopes for the success of the Conference would be realized.

21. Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom), speaking on behalf of the Western European Group of States, congratulated the President on his election and thanked all those who had contributed to the success of the preparatory process, in particular the Chairmen of the Preparatory Committee at its four sessions. He also thanked the Secretary of State of the United States for his words of welcome and opening remarks.

22. Mr. LI (China), said he was gratified that the President of the Conference was a representative of a non-aligned country and he hoped that the proceedings of the Conference would take place in a spirit of cooperation, mutual trust and respect.

ADDRESS BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

23. Mr. BOUTROS-GHALI (Secretary-General of the United Nations) said that the outcome of the Conference could support a vision of international relations that extended beyond disarmament to improved cooperation among States on issues ranging from development to international security. It was significant that the holding of the Conference coincided with the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations. By forging a joint strategy on non-proliferation, the States parties would help to define the future of international cooperation.

24. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, it was possible to look back on a record of remarkable achievement. The world had become a safer place, with the creation of machinery to support nuclear controls and safeguards, to carry out the destruction of nuclear weapons, and to ban nuclear testing. There were more States parties to the Treaty than to any other arms control and disarmament agreement; universality was within reach.

25. In some ways, however, the international situation was increasingly dangerous. Some States, despite having ratified the Treaty, were seeking to obtain materials and technology for the manufacture of weapons of mass

destruction, including nuclear weapons. It would be tragic if the end of nuclear deterrence were to be followed by a proliferation of the nuclear threat.

26. Another terrible risk which was currently recognized was the possession of weapons of mass destruction by non-State terrorist groups. The smuggling of nuclear material had become a frightening reality. Weapons-grade material could emerge in the hands of those who believed themselves beyond the reach of national and international authority.

27. It was clear that all elements of the non-proliferation regime were interconnected: the Treaty, the ban on chemical weapons, the ban on biological and toxins weapons, and efforts to curtail conventional weapons. It was essential to enhance security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States through cooperative security arrangements; to seek to advance nuclear disarmament; and to address concerns regarding access to uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

28. The question of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States had not yet been resolved. In that connection, however, he noted the recent adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995).

29. In disarmament, there had been major accomplishments; thousands of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles had been eliminated and an entire class of weapons systems had been taken out of commission. Thousands more tactical nuclear arms had been withdrawn and dismantled. In the two START Treaties, agreement had been reached to remove more than 17,000 nuclear weapons from missiles and bombers. Solutions had also been found to the problems of the nuclear weapons on the territories of the successor States to the former Soviet Union. Progress was being made at the Conference on Disarmament towards a comprehensive test ban treaty and he urged the negotiating parties to take into account the desire of the international community for an early conclusion of the treaty. An Ad Hoc Committee had been established by the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate an end to the production of fissile material for weapons purposes; that would be a major step forward in the implementation of article VI of the Treaty.

30. With regard to the transfer of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, he said that technology transfer continued to arouse concerns among suppliers and clients. IAEA was working directly with Member States to improve the physical protection of nuclear materials and to improve State systems of accounting and control. It was continuing its critical effort to develop a radiation safety infrastructure, as well as a database on illicit trafficking. He himself had established a Working Group within the Secretariat to monitor developments and to maintain liaison between the United Nations and IAEA.

31. The non-proliferation Treaty was the only multilateral legal instrument that committed States to negotiations for an early end to the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. It was the only instrument that recognized the right of parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and provided safeguards to make the peaceful use of nuclear energy a reality.

32. During the forthcoming deliberations, national security issues would clearly be of concern. It should be borne in mind that the decisions made at the Conference could affect the structure of international peace and security. He saluted the pioneering declarations of the Organization of African Unity, of the Non-Aligned Movement, and of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty had fully proved its beneficial influence. Decisive progress was being made on the drafting of an African nuclear weapon-free-zone treaty, and he hoped that the peace process in the Middle East would lead to the establishment of a similar zone, to free the entire region from weapons of mass destruction.

33. At its tenth special session, the General Assembly had called for an end to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their ultimate elimination. Since then many Member States had adopted policies in support of that great objective. Decisions made at the current Conference would be crucial to the maintenance of that momentum. The safest, surest and swiftest way to deal with the threat of nuclear arms was to do away with them. Reduction and destruction of all nuclear weapons and of the means to make them should be humanity's great common cause.

34. The Conference could mark the beginning of a new phase in arms limitation and disarmament and represent a major stride towards a world free from nuclear weapons. It could pave the way for the redirection of the vast sums of money currently spent on armaments towards the development that could ensure lasting peace. By acting with courage and determination to assure the security of generations to come, the international community could rise to the challenges of a new era and testify to its faith in the future.

ADDRESS BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

35. Mr. BLIX (Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency) said that IAEA had been given an important role in the implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty. Acceptance of the Agency's safeguards by non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty was required because the parties needed credible assurance that nuclear material and installations were used exclusively for peaceful purposes. To provide such assurance safeguards must be effective.

36. The number of States having safeguards agreements with IAEA had increased from 64 in 1975 to 118 in 1994. By late 1994, 170 power reactors, 158 research reactors and critical assemblies, 196 other facilities and 334 locations outside facilities were under safeguards. The quantity of nuclear material under safeguards, particularly plutonium and highly enriched uranium, was also increasing rapidly.

37. Reviewing the events of recent years regarding the nuclear programmes of Iraq, South Africa and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, he said that, under the cease-fire agreement at the end of the Gulf War, Iraq had been compelled to accept a far-reaching inspection regime. As a result of the lessons learnt in that case, proposals were now before IAEA which, if accepted by States, would give the Agency greater access to information and to sites, significantly increasing the level of assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. Also, since 1990, a much closer interaction had been established between IAEA and the Security Council of the United Nations.

38. In the case of South Africa, he said that that State was the first to have rolled back from a nuclear-weapon status. In that connection, he noted that transparency regarding all nuclear-related activities was important in order to build confidence in the completeness and correctness of a State's declaration of nuclear material and installations. However, even with the fullest cooperation from States, in no case could the Agency positively affirm that a declaration presented was correct and complete.

39. The case of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had shown, inter alia, that some of the measures to strengthen safeguards put in place following the case of Iraq had been effective, for instance, the use of advanced techniques which had shown that there was more plutonium in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea than that State had declared. While the Agency had never asserted that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had diverted nuclear material to a clandestine nuclear weapons programme, it had reason to believe that that could have happened and to state that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement. Conclusions had subsequently been drawn regarding several technical matters relating to detection and verification. It was also clear, however, that it was for the Security Council to determine its response on the basis of the merits of each case.

40. Current efforts to strengthen safeguards were intended to provide more credible assurance regarding the correctness and completeness of States' declarations of items subject to safeguards and thus regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. They were also aimed at making the implementation of safeguards more cost-efficient. Many of the measures identified in the new programme had been extensively tested with the help of Member States.

41. Increased Agency access to nuclear and nuclear-related sites, sometimes on a short-notice or "no-notice" basis, would be requested. That should not, however, be difficult to accept if safeguards were seen by States as an opportunity to demonstrate non-proliferation bona fides. It should also be possible to arrange for the issuance of multiple-entry visas for designated inspectors, as in the case of the Convention on Chemical Weapons.

42. With regard to the problem of illegal trafficking in nuclear materials, measures taken by the Agency to assist States included the establishment of a data bank and the provision of advice on State systems of nuclear material accountancy and control.

43. Other IAEA activities which were not related to non-proliferation Treaty safeguards included assistance in connection with negotiations on a number of regional non-proliferation treaties and nuclear-weapon-free zones. He noted that IAEA safeguards were directly relevant to the implementation of some agreements, such as the disarmament agreements that had been reached between the United States of America and the Russian Federation. The Agency was ready to provide verification for material which any nuclear-weapon State might place under safeguards.

44. A non-discriminatory ban on the production of fissile material - a so-called "cut-off" agreement - was another measure which might well be subject to IAEA verification. The Agency's capabilities could be tailored to the needs of different arms-control and disarmament agreements.

45. Negotiations were continuing regarding a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Such a treaty would involve several types of verification different from those of which the Agency had experience. There would, however, be considerable overlap between obligations under such a ban and those under the non-proliferation Treaty. It would not appear to be necessary or practical to create a new international organization for each arms-control and disarmament agreement; it would seem more practical to place "clusters" of agreements under different organizations.

46. With regard to cooperation to further the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, he said that the Agency had been the principal instrument for promoting such cooperation and the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology to developing countries. A precondition for such transfer was the existence in the recipient countries of adequate rules and structures for radiation protection. Building up such structures was a priority activity for IAEA.

47. The Agency also promoted peaceful nuclear activities through a very wide information exchange. Scientists, engineers and policy makers from developing countries participated in hundreds of meetings organized by IAEA every year. Developing countries could also benefit from the Agency's computerized bibliographical database.

48. When planning technical cooperation activities, IAEA emphasized nuclear technology which could lead to improvements in food production and preservation, health care, industrial output and the supply of fresh water. IAEA was also reviewing various options, including the use of nuclear reactors for sea-water desalinization, and, together with several other international organizations, would participate in the assessment of the benefits and problems of different power options for the future, including nuclear energy.

49. Cooperation activities undertaken by IAEA were financed through the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund. Unfortunately, however, pledges and payments to that fund had declined since 1984. IAEA needed adequate resources and strengthened and streamlined safeguards in order to carry out its functions and verify that non-proliferation pledges were respected, thereby instilling confidence among the States parties. The Agency's verification capacity could be employed in the implementation of nuclear disarmament agreements reached in pursuance of article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it could serve as a principal intergovernmental channel for the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology among States parties to the Treaty and for assistance to developing countries. He urged the Conference to ensure that there was no interruption in the services provided by IAEA under the Treaty.

ADOPTION OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE

50. The PRESIDENT said that the draft rules of procedure, contained in annex III to the final report of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.1995/1),

had been submitted to the Conference by the Chairman of the fourth session of the Preparatory Committee. While the latter had indicated that progress had been made on rule 28.3, regarding the extension of the Treaty, there continued to be divergent views on one aspect of that rule. He therefore proposed that the Conference should decide to apply provisionally the rules of procedure as proposed by the Preparatory Committee and as revised, in the case of rules 5 and 8, to reflect the agreement to increase the number of Vice-Presidents from 26 to 34.

51. It was so decided.

52. The PRESIDENT, referring to rule 44.1 of the rules of procedure, said that the Secretariat had received requests for observer status at the Conference from the following States not parties to the Treaty: Brazil, Chile, Djibouti, Israel, Oman, Pakistan, United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu. The Secretariat had also received a request from the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine asking that Palestine be granted observer status at the Conference.

53. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to accede to those requests.

54. It was so decided.

55. The PRESIDENT, referring to rule 44.3 of the rules of procedure, said that requests for observer status had been received from the following organizations: the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), the South Pacific Forum, the European Community, the League of Arab States, the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the North Atlantic Assembly.

56. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to accede to those requests.

57. It was so decided.

ELECTION OF CHAIRMEN AND VICE-CHAIRMEN OF THE MAIN COMMITTEES, THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE AND THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE

58. The PRESIDENT said that, at its fourth session, the Preparatory Committee had agreed to recommend the following as Chairmen of the three Main Committees and the Drafting Committee: Mr. Ayewah (Nigeria), Main Committee I; Mr. Erdös (Hungary), Main Committee II; Mr. Ramaker (Netherlands), Main Committee III and Mr. Strulak (Poland), the Drafting Committee. The Preparatory Committee had also agreed to recommend a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States as Chairman of the Credentials Committee and had subsequently nominated Mr. Garcia (Colombia).

59. Mr. Ayewah (Nigeria), Mr. Erdös (Hungary), Mr. Ramaker (Netherlands), Mr. Strulak (Poland) and Mr. Garcia (Colombia) were elected Chairmen of Main Committee I, Main Committee II, Main Committee III, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee respectively.

60. The PRESIDENT said that, in accordance with rule 5 of the rules of procedure, the Conference would elect two Vice-Chairmen for each of the three Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee. The following nominations had been received: Mr. Starr (Australia) and Mr. Zlenko (Ukraine), Main Committee I; Mr. de la Torre (Argentina) and a representative from the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries whose name had not yet been received, Main Committee II; Mr. Yanev (Bulgaria) and a representative from the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries whose name had not been received, Main Committee III; Mr. Patokallio (Finland) and a representative from the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries whose name had not yet been received, the Drafting Committee and Mr. Sychou (Belarus) and Mrs. Hoinkes (United States of America), the Credentials Committee.

61. Mr. Starr (Australia) and Mr. Zlenko (Ukraine) were elected Vice-Chairmen of Main Committee I; Mr. de la Torre (Argentina) was elected Vice-Chairman of Main Committee II; Mr. Yanev (Bulgaria) was elected Vice-Chairman of Main Committee III; Mr. Patokallio (Finland) was elected Vice-Chairman of the Drafting Committee; and Mr. Sychou (Belarus) and Mrs. Hoinkes (United States of America) were elected Vice-Chairmen of the Credentials Committee.

62. The PRESIDENT said that consultations on the outstanding nominations for Vice-Chairmen of the Committees were still continuing and that he would inform the Conference of those nominations at an appropriate time.

ELECTION OF VICE-PRESIDENTS

63. The PRESIDENT said that consideration of the election of Vice-Presidents of the Conference would be deferred until all nominations had been received.

CREDENTIALS OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE CONFERENCE

(a) APPOINTMENT OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE

64. The PRESIDENT, referring to rule 3 of the rules of procedure, which provided that six members of the Credentials Committee were to be appointed on the proposal of the President of the Conference, said that consultations were continuing on nominations to the Credentials Committee and that he would convey to the Conference the outcome of those consultations at the appropriate time.

CONFIRMATION OF THE NOMINATION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

65. The PRESIDENT said that, at its first session, the Preparatory Committee had decided to invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultation with the members of the Preparatory Committee, to nominate an official to act as provisional Secretary-General of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. At its second session, the Secretary-General had nominated Mr. Prvoslav Davinic, Director of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs, as provisional Secretary-General of the Conference.

66. Mr. Davinic was confirmed as Secretary-General of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA

67. The PRESIDENT said that, if he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to adopt the agenda as contained in annex IV of the final report of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.1995/1), including the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee in annex V regarding the allocation of items to the three Main Committees.

68. The agenda was adopted.

The meeting rose at 5.10 p.m.

1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.1995/SR.2
20 April 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

1995 REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 2nd MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Tuesday, 18 April 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)

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GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

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95-80688 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. JUPPE (France), speaking on behalf of the European Union and Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic, said that, although the countries of Europe differed in their level of economic development, recent political history and choices with regard to the use of nuclear energy, they all held in common the values of democracy and freedom. They were also united by their common commitment to the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). That commitment was based on the conviction that the proliferation of nuclear weapons was a threat to peace and international security, and that the NPT served the fundamental interests of the international community.

2. Concerning non-proliferation, the predictions made 20 years earlier that there would be 20 to 30 nuclear-weapon States by the end of the century had not materialized; in fact, South Africa's decision to renounce its weapons signalled an opposite trend. The draft treaty on the denuclearization of Africa had the support of all the European countries, who welcomed it as an undertaking for the peace and stability of that continent. Brazil, Argentina and Chile had given up their intention to acquire nuclear weapons, and Cuba's recent signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco should allow the conclusion of a legal instrument to prevent the emergence of nuclear weapons in the Latin American region. The discovery during the Gulf War of a secret nuclear programme in Iraq had led to a rethinking of the spirit in which International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards were carried out. They were currently based not only on trust among signatory countries, but also on improved capability to detect possible clandestine activities, which was indispensable for maintaining their credibility. As in the case of North Korea, the Agency must be able to verify effectively that States were complying with their obligations.

3. As the review would confirm, the Treaty made it possible for many countries to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, because of the confidence generated by compliance with its obligations. Export controls, far from being an obstacle to the development of trade in nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, were an essential component of the international system of non-proliferation.

4. During the 1990s, détente and peace had led to unprecedented disarmament accords between the two main adversaries of the cold war, and a return to the situation that had prevailed just ten years earlier was almost inconceivable. The arms race had ended: the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia would be reduced by nearly two thirds, and the two European nuclear powers had begun unilateral arms reduction efforts.

5. For the first time in history, the international community had decided to begin negotiations on a complete nuclear test ban treaty that would be universal and verifiable. The European Union welcomed the forthcoming opening of

negotiations at the Disarmament Conference to draft a convention banning the production of fissile materials for explosive purposes. It also welcomed the efforts by the five nuclear-weapon States to respond to the expectations of the non-nuclear signatories of the NPT regarding security assurances. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) provided a collective, global and concrete response to that problem.

6. The European Union solemnly reaffirmed its commitment, in accordance with article VI of NPT, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. The world was still going through a phase of change and instability, and the nature of the balances on which the next century would be founded was still unknown. Although there were an ever-growing number of accessions to the NPT, stronger international safeguards, more diversified means of verification and greater international solidarity, new regional ambitions were surfacing where the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction could be particularly dangerous. In order to reduce the risks of uncertainty and instability, increase confidence among States and strengthen the international legal status of the NPT, the Treaty must be made permanent. What united the parties to the NPT was more important than what divided them. The international community expected from the participants in the Conference the consolidation of the system of non-proliferation and confirmation of the disarmament process, and the indefinite extension of the Treaty was the only solution compatible with those objectives.

7. Mr. SPRING (Ireland) said that the international community was faced with the double task of removing any uncertainty about the future of the non-proliferation regime and ensuring that the regime was strengthened to respond to the changing circumstances and risks of the twenty-first century. Ireland's objectives for the Conference and other forums on nuclear disarmament were to see the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, to ensure that those who possessed nuclear weapons and technology did not pass it on to non-nuclear-weapon States, to end the testing of nuclear weapons everywhere, for all time, to end the production and stockpiling of materials for use in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, to strengthen further the detection, safeguard and verification systems, and to see the environmental, health and safety issues associated with the nuclear industry effectively addressed. Some argued that the only way to achieve those objectives was a series of short, conditional extensions of the Treaty, but in his view, any action that placed a question mark over the long-term future of the NPT would be a step backward.

8. Ireland had been very closely associated with the NPT from the days of its genesis in the United Nations General Assembly nearly 40 years earlier, and had been the first country to ratify the Treaty. The NPT was the most widely supported disarmament measure in history, and for the first time, all five declared nuclear-weapon States were participating in the Conference. Nuclear non-proliferation had become a global norm, and that achievement must be secured. For the Treaty to be fully effective, it should be universal, and the parties must continue to challenge those States holding out against membership to explain their reasons.

9. Like other non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, Ireland had forgone, as a matter of principle, the option of developing nuclear weapons

capability. It believed that the only acceptable level of nuclear weapons was zero. Twenty-five years after entry into force of the Treaty, there was no justification for the existing stocks of nuclear weapons and fissile materials. The obvious first step in moving to zero nuclear weapons was to stop their development and to end nuclear testing. The achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty would realize a major unfulfilled aspiration of the NPT. Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, the moratoria on nuclear testing introduced by the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom and France would continue. He called on China to introduce a similar ban.

10. The commitments undertaken by States to forgo, control and eliminate nuclear weapons would mean little if they were not accompanied by stringent verification arrangements. The serious challenges to the system of IAEA safeguards, notably in Iraq and North Korea, although rigorously addressed, none the less made it clear that confidence in the adequacy of the system must be strengthened. Some had asserted that the safeguards system must be based on trust, but it was, rather, an effective safeguards system that could create an atmosphere of confidence and trust. A more intrusive inspection system than the one currently existing would be a small price to pay for increased confidence and security.

11. An issue of particular concern to Ireland was the treatment of fissile material in the nuclear-weapon States. The Review Conference must emphasize the need for such material to be placed under IAEA safeguards and for non-nuclear-weapon States to avoid stockpiling plutonium in excess of normal operational requirements for peaceful nuclear programmes. Knowledge of the risks associated with the nuclear industry was far greater than it had been when the NPT had been negotiated: the Chernobyl disaster had opened a new era of awareness. The IAEA had a key function as the universal forum for the promotion of internationally acceptable safety levels in the nuclear industry. Of particular concern to Ireland was the environmental impact of the nuclear power installations across the Irish Sea at Sellafield.

12. The non-proliferation regime depended on the confidence of each State in the present and future behaviour of others. The international community could not yet be confident either of preventing the diversion of nuclear energy for peaceful uses to nuclear weapons programmes or of handling civilian nuclear materials safely, much less of managing the abundance of weapons-grade material in the world. Although the NPT could not itself generate adequate responses to these challenges, without credible guarantees that the Treaty would endure, the elements of the international non-proliferation regime would risk entering into decline. A series of short extensions would punctuate the future of the Treaty with question marks which would inevitably detract from its credibility.

13. It had been argued that those who were calling for the indefinite extension of the Treaty were tacitly consenting to the retention of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States. Yet, it was in the NPT alone that all five nuclear-weapon States had undertaken a legal obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament in good faith. The indefinite extension of the NPT was not incompatible with determined action on nuclear disarmament. It was a central part of the process of persuading those who possessed nuclear weapons to give them up and convincing others not to acquire them. The broad constituency of

States legally committed to non-proliferation and to nuclear disarmament through the NPT gave it its strength and held out a real hope for a world in which nuclear weapons no longer had a place.

14. An uncertain or weakened NPT, subject to the vagaries of negotiations at regular intervals or to progress in other forums, would seriously undermine confidence and put at risk all that had been achieved over the past 25 years. The message that should go out from the Conference was that the nuclear non-proliferation regime was permanent and that its contribution to the prevention of nuclear war remained vital not only to the current generation, but to succeeding generations as well.

15. Mr. EVANS (Australia) said that all nations - the nuclear-weapon States, the non-nuclear-weapon States, and even States which had not joined the NPT - had major interests at stake in its continued success. The growth in the Treaty's membership to its current level of 178 States reflected its success in preventing the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. Australia itself had been seen as one of the countries with the capability and possible intention to develop nuclear weapons, but as a direct consequence of the NPT, had chosen not to pursue that option.

16. The threat of global nuclear war had clearly receded, but regional conflicts of the kind seen in recent years risked provoking wider tensions, and the possibility that they would engage the interests of States possessing nuclear weapons capability could not be ruled out. Cases of non-compliance with the non-proliferation regime itself, new concerns about nuclear smuggling, and the presence of facilities without safeguards in India, Pakistan and Israel were issues that must be faced. There were no grounds for complacency about the ability of the non-proliferation regime to continue to provide the current level of security.

17. The objectives of the Conference must be to establish non-proliferation irrevocably as the future standard for international behaviour, to continue and accelerate progress towards nuclear disarmament, to achieve universal membership in the Treaty, and to strengthen cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

18. The NPT was, with the United Nations Charter, fundamental to the maintenance of international security. Australia very strongly supported indefinite extension of the Treaty. A world which did not have a treaty regime in place for the containment of nuclear proliferation and the elimination of existing nuclear weapons was unthinkable. The NPT was the only treaty of global reach that bound its members to those objectives. A decision of indefinite extension, therefore, was the only possible position of principle to take for those resolutely committed to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. Indefinite extension would also be most effective in pressing the declared nuclear-weapon States to continue the process of nuclear disarmament and in containing the nuclear aspirations of the so-called threshold States.

19. Indefinite extension of the Treaty offered the best encouragement for continuing the process of nuclear arms reduction which had finally begun. In Australia's view, to allow the decision on extension to be influenced by a

desire to punish one group of States or another for their past performance would be as misguided as it would be dangerous for the Member States' wider interests in the Treaty. The end of the cold war made progress in nuclear disarmament possible for the first time since the beginning of the nuclear age. The United States and Russia were each destroying about 2,000 weapons a year under the provisions of the START I and START II agreements, and the process had been extended to Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus under the Lisbon Protocol. All five nuclear-weapon States had come to support the negotiation of a convention to ban the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, and had also agreed on improved security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

20. The NPT had played a vital role in creating the conditions of confidence about non-proliferation which had allowed nuclear disarmament to proceed. A qualified decision to extend the Treaty could not possibly help the disarmament process. Indefinite extension of the NPT was the only way to reassure the nuclear-weapon States that further nuclear disarmament could be achieved without unacceptable security risks.

21. The argument that indefinite expansion would somehow legitimize the status of the nuclear-weapon States was quite unfounded; the NPT had been the single most important factor in establishing the international norm against nuclear weapons, and it remained the only international nuclear disarmament agreement which had been signed by all five nuclear-weapon States. It was therefore necessary to press ahead towards the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, and to continue and accelerate the process of deep reductions agreed between the United States and Russia; the three smaller nuclear-weapon States should join that process at the earliest appropriate opportunity. Australia also desired a permanent and comprehensive end to nuclear weapons testing through the rapid conclusion of negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), one to which it intended to be an original signatory, and it also looked forward to the opening of negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes.

22. The existence of threshold or "twilight zone" States, remaining outside the Treaty and strongly suspected of possessing nuclear weapons capability, was sometimes used as a criticism of the Treaty. However, if such States were not prepared to join the 178 other States in forswearing nuclear weapons forever, they and not the Treaty were responsible. Indefinite extension of the Treaty was the only way to eventually convince such States to renounce nuclear weapons. Regional tensions and rivalries fuelled regional arms races that posed disturbing dangers for international security, but the NPT offered the assurance, through international inspection, that States were adhering to their undertakings not to acquire nuclear weapons. Only by indefinite renewal could the NPT continue to offer threshold States the security assurances they needed to break out of the cycle of nuclear escalation, or could the parties to the Treaty exert increased pressure on the threshold States to renounce nuclear weapons. South Africa's recent decision to join the NPT was influenced by the attraction of enhanced security and by the international pressures against possession of nuclear weapons brought to bear by a strong NPT, and thus illustrated the vital necessity of indefinite extension of the Treaty.

23. Indefinite extension was also vital for those wishing to engage in peaceful nuclear cooperation under the provisions of the NPT, as such cooperation required an assured environment of long-term security and stability. The significance of long-term non-proliferation assurances was magnified by the fact that planning, constructing and operating nuclear plants often required several decades, as well as heavy investments of financial and other resources. Indefinite extension would provide the basis for the long-term assurance essential to both suppliers and recipients of nuclear technology that their cooperation was for exclusively peaceful purposes and did not risk proliferation.

24. By ensuring that nuclear material, equipment and technology were provided to non-nuclear-weapon States only where subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards, export licensing or other export controls reinforced the Treaty's essential non-proliferation objective, and also helped to establish the environment of long-term assurance and stability necessary for effective cooperation. Moreover, such export controls could not be portrayed as a cartel or conspiracy exceeding the legitimate terms of the Treaty.

25. An aspect of those controls of particular interest to Australia was the central role of full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply to non-nuclear-weapon States, a principle which had become the accepted international standard for such transactions and had also been incorporated into the supply guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Australia hoped that members would endorse that principle by consensus in reviewing the operations of the Treaty.

26. The proliferation dangers which had led to the Treaty's creation 25 years previously had been held in check, but in the face of new challenges presented by technological advances and illicit transfers of nuclear material, the NPT and the norm of behaviour it entailed were more important than ever. The argument for indefinite extension of the Treaty could be summarized in a few words: Any decision to qualify or limit renewal of the Treaty could only weaken it, and an outcome that damaged the Treaty could not be risked. Only a decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely could guarantee that its objectives would be met and that the interests of all its members would be protected.

27. Mr. KOVÁCS (Hungary) said that for the previous 25 years, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had been an outstanding example of States' ability to find mutually acceptable solutions to even the most complex problems; in the case of the Treaty, the stake at risk continued to be the very survival of mankind. Over an arduous negotiation process, the States had arrived at the historic agreement that the proliferation of nuclear weapons must be prevented. Twenty-five years later, the States similarly agreed that they needed a durable and dependable Treaty that could serve as a basis for their security and for that of the entire world.

28. Hungary was convinced that the real interests of the States called for the indefinite extension of the Treaty, and fully shared the position expressed by the representative of the European Union. While it rejected the idea of linking the extension of the Treaty to certain achievements in other negotiations, it in no way wished to deny the necessity of conducting those negotiations with the

greatest resolve. Hungary wished to stress the urgent need to conclude further treaties on nuclear arms control and disarmament, and noted with satisfaction the strong commitment of the two Powers parties to START I and START II to implement those treaties and to explore further drastic cuts in their nuclear arsenals. It also wholeheartedly welcomed Security Council resolution 984 (1995), which it viewed as a major contribution towards providing additional security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. Such measures would constitute important contributions to fulfilling Member States' common obligations under article VI of the Treaty. In actuality, the indefinite extension of the NPT was a vital requirement for maintaining the conditions and atmosphere necessary to ensure progress in those negotiations.

29. Hungary commended the IAEA for providing non-proliferation assurances through its safeguards system, and called for universal application of those safeguards. It also encouraged all nuclear-weapon States to submit their peaceful nuclear installations to those safeguards under the voluntary offer agreements. It continued to support the Agency's efforts to improve and strengthen existing safeguards, and joined those who were calling for an improved IAEA safeguards system capable of providing credible assurances regarding not only declared nuclear activities but also the absence of undeclared nuclear activities.

30. Hungary had been a committed advocate of various efforts to further strengthen elements of the non-proliferation regime. The principle of full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply for any significant new nuclear export had been incorporated into its export licensing regulations and practice. The implementation and continuous updating of the agreed common policy of supplier States facilitated cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by enhancing confidence that nuclear exports would not contribute to unsafeguarded fuel cycles or any weapons-related activities.

31. The new phenomenon of the illicit transfer and smuggling of nuclear materials posed challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime; in order to eliminate that threat, an increased physical protection system of nuclear materials needed to be introduced in all countries, along with a higher level of international cooperation.

32. In Hungary, nuclear power generation provided about one half of total electricity production, and advanced nuclear-related scientific activities had been developed. A significant part of Hungary's achievements in the nuclear field had been accomplished through international cooperation. The Treaty had greatly promoted bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Hungary remained committed to the broadest cooperation in that respect with all those countries that respected the objectives of nuclear non-proliferation.

33. As Chairman-in-Office for 1995 of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, he wished to draw attention to document NPT/CONF.1995/13 containing an excerpt from the Budapest Summit Declaration adopted in December 1994 by the Heads of State and Government of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It reflected the strong belief of those 52 States that the proliferation of nuclear and other

weapons of mass destruction, and missiles to deliver them, posed a threat to international peace, security and stability and that the non-proliferation Treaty should be indefinitely and unconditionally extended.

34. Mr. KINKEL (Germany) said that the Conference was not a routine diplomatic event; the decision to be taken was of crucial importance for peace and security in the twenty-first century. At stake was the future of mankind. The threat arising from the most dangerous of all weapons of mass destruction must be averted. Although the nuclear genie could not be forced back into the bottle, everything must be done to tame it. Many strategies to that end had failed. The non-proliferation Treaty was a realistic and successful response to the nuclear challenge, based on the recognition that a continually increasing number of nuclear-weapon States was bound to lead to incalculable risks for the survival of mankind.

35. At a time of mistrust between East and West and disagreement between North and South, the Treaty had been the first evidence of a new global thinking. Forced upon the signatory States by a common survival instinct, a historic compromise had been founded which took account of their common interests. In spite of its deficiencies, the Treaty had lived up to all expectations over the past 25 years. Dangerous developments in the direction of the proliferation of nuclear weapons had been halted or reversed. The number of signatory States had risen to 178. All the successor States of the Soviet Union had acceded. Africa had become a nuclear-weapon-free zone. If the Treaty was extended indefinitely, it would be easier to persuade the other countries to join. The Treaty was the guarantor of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the control of IAEA; IAEA was making a valuable contribution through its technical assistance programmes. Now that the confrontation between East and West was over, the Treaty was needed more than ever. In a multipolar world full of nuclear players, there could no longer be a balance of terror, only an omnipresent threat. Nuclear proliferation was no longer a danger for States alone: nuclear civil wars and atomic weapons in the hands of terrorists had become conceivable.

36. Germany had long ago renounced all types of weapons of mass destruction, and had proved that renunciation of nuclear weapons was in no way a disadvantage. That decision was wholeheartedly supported by all democratic parties in the German Bundestag. Germany was fully committed to all the obligations arising from the Treaty. It appreciated the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States and would continue to urge further energetic steps towards disarmament. However, it rejected the idea of making the Treaty's extension conditional, since that would only play into the hands of those who sought a pretext to justify their own nuclear ambitions. For Germany, the durability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime had absolute priority over all other considerations. More States were committed to the Treaty than to any other international agreement except the Charter. There was now an unprecedented opportunity to make the ban on the proliferation of nuclear weapons a universal norm of international law, provided that agreement was reached on an indefinite, unconditional extension of the Treaty. The United Nations was needed as the guardian of non-proliferation. The Security Council should play an active role in that respect.

37. In recent years, the nuclear disarmament obligation in article VI had been fulfilled to an extent no one could have imagined. That process must be vigorously continued; the five nuclear Powers must fulfil that obligation since it had been the very reason for the accession to the Treaty of the great majority of the community of nations.

38. In order to make the nuclear disarmament process irreversible, no more fissionable material must be produced for weapons purposes, and weapons-grade fissionable material from dismantled weaponry must not be used to build new weapons and must not fall into the hands of nuclear smugglers. Hundreds of tonnes of spare plutonium must be reliably monitored. Germany reiterated its proposal for an international plutonium regime.

39. There was an urgent need for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. If the 1995 deadline could not be met, it must be signed in 1996.

40. The expansion of the Conference on Disarmament was long overdue. The article VI obligation applied to all signatory States, whether they were nuclear-weapon States or not. Therefore, the sole multilateral negotiating forum for global disarmament and arms control should be open to all those who wished to participate.

41. In the light of events in Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the instruments available to IAEA must be further strengthened. The right to conduct special inspections in non-declared sites must be exercised and enforced.

42. Germany welcomed the merging and harmonization of the declarations by the nuclear-weapon States on security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) was an important step in that direction.

43. Everyone knew that the real problems facing mankind on the threshold of the twenty-first century, including mass migration and terrorism, environmental disasters, poverty and overpopulation, could not be solved through the possession of nuclear weapons. However, stopping proliferation for all time and a permanent disarmament pledge by the nuclear-weapon States were major preconditions for solving those problems.

44. Germany therefore called for the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty.

45. Mrs. AGNELLI (Italy) paid tribute to the two French peacekeepers who had lost their lives in Sarajevo over the past weekend.

46. The substantial achievements of the non-proliferation Treaty were clear: the proliferation of nuclear weapons had been effectively contained, and the security of all States dramatically enhanced. Her delegation fully endorsed the statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France on behalf of the European Union and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Italy firmly believed that the Treaty must acquire a permanent character, thereby further contributing to peace and stability in the world.

47. Italy had ratified the Treaty after an extensive and difficult internal debate, during which serious concerns had been raised. During the negotiations on the Treaty, Italy had strongly promoted the arrangements for periodic reviews of its implementation and had been in favour of limiting its validity to an initial 25-year period. In the midst of the cold war, the East-West confrontation had posed a threat to its security and to its very survival. Italy's decision to forgo the nuclear option had been a gesture of responsibility and trust in international agreements and obligations. At that time the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, had been in full acceleration. The renunciation of nuclear weapons had been particularly significant for countries like Italy that were politically and geographically most exposed to the East-West confrontation and that had the technological and industrial capability to become nuclear powers.

48. The international situation had profoundly changed. The danger to mankind was no longer the nuclear arms race - "vertical" proliferation - but "horizontal" proliferation, including the possibility of terrorist organizations arming themselves with weapons of mass destruction.

49. The process of negotiating nuclear disarmament in accordance with the commitments of article VI of the Treaty was well under way. Nuclear disarmament, starting with the two major nuclear Powers, had become irreversible. It would be a mistake to ignore the new realities and respond to the problem of nuclear proliferation with the logic of the cold war. Although some countries continued to feel that the Treaty perpetuated differences in status, Italy felt that that view was out of step with the times, when the role of the United Nations as an instrument to maintain peace and security was being strengthened. Italy appealed to those countries which still had doubts about the wisdom of indefinitely extending the Treaty to recognize the new political and security realities and draw the appropriate conclusions, bearing in mind the global interests of the international community.

50. Italy understood the concerns expressed about the slow pace in the negotiation or implementation of important agreements in the field of nuclear disarmament. However, it must be recognized that significant results had been achieved, even if they were not yet conclusive. A comprehensive test-ban treaty was likely to be concluded shortly. In the meantime, a moratorium on nuclear testing had already been decided on and implemented by most nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on prohibiting the production of fissile material for military purposes were expected to begin soon. Italy, as a member of the Security Council, was promoting a global system of adequate security assurances by nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty which effectively complied with their obligations. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) testified to major progress in that direction.

51. Italy recognized the importance of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and understood the legitimate expectations of those countries that wished to acquire nuclear capability for the purpose. As a member of the European Union, it was contributing to several assistance projects, especially in the area of nuclear safety, involving the transfer of technology for economic development. Strict safeguards were needed to prevent possible diversions of nuclear material for

military purposes. Safeguards should also be applied to nuclear installations, especially those of an older generation, to ensure that a satisfactory level of safety was maintained.

52. In Europe, the Treaty had become an integral part of the political and strategic environment and was ensuring stability. The decision made by the Heads of State and Government of the 15 countries of the European Union to undertake common action to promote the indefinite extension of the Treaty was clear evidence of their commitment to non-proliferation.

53. As a Mediterranean country, Italy welcomed the recent accession of Algeria to the Treaty and was following with interest the progress already made towards making the African continent a nuclear-weapon-free zone. South Africa's decision to renounce the nuclear option confirmed that the possession of nuclear weapons was reversible, and was a highly significant precedent. Italy attached great importance to the efforts under way to establish an area free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The principle of universality which inspired the Treaty obviously applied to that area too. Italy appealed to all countries in the Middle East to accept the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

54. Italy was convinced that the indefinite extension of the Treaty, far from being an obstacle to the ongoing and future negotiations on disarmament, would facilitate their success. The development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would also greatly benefit. The work programmes of the relevant international forums, in particular the Conference on Disarmament, confirmed that the process of arms reduction, particularly of nuclear weapons, was irreversible. Moreover, there would be no impediment to the supply of equipment and technology to countries with a genuine interest in using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only.

55. Mr. DURÃO BARROSO (Portugal) said that in recent years the international community had shown a common interest in the search for a solution to the continuing spread of weapons of mass destruction. The end of the cold war had brought the revival of some ancient questions which had in the past led to world-wide suffering and destruction. There was an escalation of ethnic intolerance, and growing nationalism and regional conflicts, sometimes involving a relentless quest for the possession of weapons of mass destruction. The proliferation of such weapons was one of the greatest dangers to international peace and stability. The recognition of the need to halt their proliferation was evidenced by the increasing number of adherents to the Treaty.

56. The Treaty was unique; it was the pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential guarantor of the development of international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Portugal believed that further improvements in the international non-proliferation regime could be achieved. IAEA had done much to ensure the compliance of States parties with the Treaty's provisions, relying on the willingness of States to cooperate and fulfil the agreements signed. A renewed system of safeguards should enable IAEA to verify in an effective and transparent manner the enforcement of the obligations undertaken by the States parties through their full-scope safeguards agreements and the Treaty provisions. Portugal was firmly convinced of the need

to strengthen the existing safeguards system through the use of new technologies.

57. The Treaty had been the major political and legal barrier against the spread of nuclear weapons. It was the only global non-proliferation instrument and it had created an international norm that isolated States outside the regime which persisted in their efforts to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. At the same time it reflected the commitment of States parties to collective security because it was the only international agreement that obliged its parties to pursue measures for global disarmament.

58. Portugal fully supported the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty and endorsed the statement by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs in that respect. Without a durable non-proliferation Treaty, it was doubtful whether its achievements, as well as the current disarmament process and the consolidation of the non-proliferation regime, could be maintained. An indefinite extension would also provide a major reason for those States which insisted in staying out of the regime to join it or, at least, to adopt measures compatible with the existing non-proliferation norms; otherwise, they would risk becoming even more isolated. Any decision other than indefinite extension could undermine the whole non-proliferation system built upon the Treaty, thereby damaging its credibility and creating a feeling of instability within the international community.

59. The current international political momentum was favourable to that decision. Over the past few years there had been an unprecedented movement towards effective reduction of nuclear arsenals all over the world. The START treaties, along with the Lisbon Protocol and further unilateral decisions, would significantly reduce the number of nuclear weapons belonging to or in the control of the existing nuclear Powers.

60. Portugal also supported the ongoing negotiations of the Conference on Disarmament for a comprehensive test-ban treaty and looked forward to its early conclusion as well as the conclusion of a convention to prohibit the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. It welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995).

61. The indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty would better serve the interests of all States and thus preserve international peace and stability.

62. Mr. GURRIA (Mexico) said that the main problem in evaluating the application of the Treaty stemmed from the fact that it had been originally intended to perpetuate a situation that favoured nuclear-weapon States over non-nuclear-weapon States. That was why it had been deemed necessary to include certain conditions that the non-nuclear countries felt should be met in order to justify their decisions to abandon their rights to acquire nuclear weapons. However, as a result of changes in the international climate, especially the end of the cold war, the prospects for achieving progress in negotiations on a treaty prohibiting nuclear testing were very bright. In that connection, his delegation was encouraged by the steps already taken by the Russian Federation and the United States under the START I and II Treaties.

63. Mexico had provided irrefutable proof of its commitment to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and wished to stress the need to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race. In that regard, nuclear-weapon States should firmly commit themselves to the elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth starting with the complete ban on nuclear testing. The Treaty of Tlatelolco, a legally binding instrument which banned the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of the use of such weapons in the Latin American and Caribbean region, should serve as an example to the whole world.

64. The international community should avoid polarization and make use of the unique opportunity offered by the Conference to achieve a consensus on the best means of consolidating the Treaty and ensuring its universal application in the twenty-first century. While his delegation understood the concern of those delegations which considered that limiting the effectiveness of the Treaty might endanger an instrument that continued to be the basis of the non-proliferation system, it nevertheless shared the opinion that States parties must continue to fight for nuclear disarmament. The extension of the Treaty was not an end in itself. Accordingly, any decision arising out of the Conference should consider several interrelated elements, namely: extending the Treaty with modalities emerging from a balance among all States parties; approving a treaty prohibiting nuclear testing within a year; starting negotiations on an agreement for the prohibition of fissile materials for military purposes as soon as possible; establishing binding negative security assurances for non-nuclear countries; strengthening the current safeguards regime of IAEA; and approving a reinforced review mechanism guaranteeing a periodic evaluation of the Treaty.

65. His delegation was prepared to participate in good faith in negotiations to find a suitable formula that enjoyed the support of the vast majority of the States parties and that took into account the universal concern about nuclear issues, not only the non-proliferation aspect thereof but also the need to make progress towards genuine and effective disarmament.

66. Mr. IKIMI (Nigeria) said that the considerable increase in the number of signatory States since the Fourth Review Conference reflected the desire of the majority of Member States for general and complete disarmament. As an early signatory, Nigeria had faithfully carried out its obligations under the Treaty; it had also concluded a Safeguards Agreement with IAEA. Nigeria's adherence to the Treaty stemmed from its conviction that enduring security could not be built on the possession of nuclear weapons. It therefore remained committed to the goal of nuclear disarmament. It continued to be active in all disarmament matters and collaborated with other countries in the effort to ensure a speedy negotiation of agreements that would strengthen the non-proliferation regime. As a result of their collective faith in the usefulness of the Treaty, many States had remained faithful to its provisions in spite of the inequities of the rights and obligations embedded therein.

67. The Treaty had been extremely successful in preventing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons since there were only five acknowledged nuclear-weapon States. Other positive developments attributable to the Treaty were the growing number of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including the imminent treaty on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone. Over the previous five years there had also been commendable developments in bilateral nuclear disarmament

between the Russian Federation and the United States, while South Africa, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine had given up their nuclear weapons. Those States had demonstrated that it was possible to do so without loss of status or diminished security.

68. However, his delegation was deeply concerned that, while the Treaty had succeeded in preventing the emergence of nuclear-weapon States, very little had been achieved in curbing the qualitative and quantitative improvement of nuclear weapons. Despite the intention of the Russian Federation and the United States to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals under the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II), they were yet to take concrete steps towards the elimination of nuclear weapons altogether. Indeed, when fully implemented, START II would still leave the two major nuclear-weapon States with more than enough warheads to wipe out human civilization. Nigeria was therefore calling for deeper cuts and urging the other nuclear-weapon States to undertake similar efforts. It also expected that all States parties would pursue the negotiations in good faith on measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the elimination of nuclear weapons in accordance with their obligations under the Treaty.

69. Nigeria was worried about the extent of the commitments of the nuclear-weapon States parties not to transfer nuclear weapons or other explosive devices and related technology to other States and about selective compliance, which had enabled non-parties to acquire a nuclear-weapons capability. There was no doubt that such actions had led to the emergence of nuclear-threshold States and to the diversion of nuclear materials to weapons programmes. That situation could not but erode the confidence of many non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty and undermine its future viability.

70. Indeed, 25 years after the coming into force of the Treaty, none of the concrete disarmament measures envisaged therein had been accomplished and even the relative progress recorded at the Conference on Disarmament on a comprehensive test-ban treaty was tentative and not irreversible. In that connection, Security Council resolution 984 (1995) had fallen short of the desire of many non-nuclear-weapon States for a multilaterally negotiated and legally binding treaty prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. In that regard, the previous Review Conference had considered Nigeria's draft agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. It was designed to allay the anxieties of non-nuclear-weapon States over their vulnerability to nuclear intimidation as a result of their permanent military disadvantage.

71. The International Atomic Energy Agency must be assisted with adequate resources to perform its dual mandate. It was disappointing that despite faithful African adherence to the Treaty and the conclusion of safeguards agreements with IAEA, access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and enabling facilities had not been forthcoming. Although verification of compliance was a vital element in any disarmament agreement, the existing safeguards mechanism of NPT had proved to be inadequate for the monitoring of compliance with treaty obligations. The time had come for comprehensive and non-discriminatory verification provisions applicable to all States parties.

72. Glossing over the failures of the Treaty and extending it indefinitely would be an invitation to a nuclear disorder. The decision on extension must adequately address the concerns of all States parties and must meet the international security challenges of the present and future generations. Nigeria supported extension of the Treaty for a fixed period to be determined by the Conference with the proviso that it must not lapse at the end of that period. The spirit of give and take that had facilitated the conclusion of negotiations on the Treaty should equally prevail in the Conference deliberations in order to develop a programme of nuclear disarmament aimed at achieving a nuclear-free world in the twenty-first century.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.

1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 3rd MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Tuesday, 18 April 1995, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)

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95-80700 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

OBSERVER STATUS FOR CUBA

1. The PRESIDENT announced that Cuba had requested observer status at the Conference. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference acceded to that request.

2. It was so decided.

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

3. Mr. SYANKO (Belarus) said that the Conference was an historic event of great importance to strategic stability and international security. The dramatic changes in East-West relations and the conclusion of disarmament agreements had laid the groundwork for totally new, non-conflictual relations in the world. Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and ultimately eliminating them was a key to building a new world order.

4. Belarus believed that indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was the basis for speedy progress in that direction. That position was a logical extension of the line of conduct that Belarus had set for itself in the area of nuclear disarmament in 1991 when, as a newly independent State, it had faced the various problems posed by its succession to the nuclear status and the nuclear arsenals of the former Soviet Union. Belarus had been the first of the former Soviet republics to declare that any agreement on the nuclear treaty legacy should fall within the scope of multilateral negotiations and be screened by the respective parliaments. It had also written its non-nuclear status into its declaration of sovereignty and its Constitution.

5. Translating its intentions into action, Belarus had undertaken sweeping nuclear disarmament measures in its territory as early as April 1992. It had also ratified the START I Treaty and acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State, becoming the first State to willingly renounce the possession of nuclear weapons. To complete those measures, it had in recent days signed a safeguards agreement with IAEA.

6. It was easy to imagine the problems that the Soviet nuclear legacy would have caused had there been no non-proliferation Treaty when the Soviet Union broke up. In its political decisions, Belarus had frequently drawn inspiration from the moral and legal principles on which the Treaty was based. The possibility that similar situations might arise in the future should be duly considered.

7. Belarus was aware that the Treaty was not perfect and that, in many ways, it reflected the balance of interests that had existed at the time of its signing. His country nevertheless believed that the Treaty represented the only possible basis for achieving comprehensive nuclear disarmament and that its

indefinite extension was therefore essential and would, moreover, provide the framework for more stringent nuclear arms proliferation deterrents.

8. Turning to international efforts that might ensure a successful Conference and a viable non-proliferation Treaty, he mentioned, first of all, the adoption of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. His country was concerned that the draft treaty had acquired numerous terms and conditions that threatened its universality and that the Conference on Disarmament, of which Belarus was not a member, seemed to be in no hurry to resolve the deadlock on enlarging its membership. He believed that the latter issue had a direct bearing on the universality of the future comprehensive test-ban treaty.

9. In the same connection, Belarus welcomed the creation by the Conference on Disarmament of a special committee on the cessation of the production of fissionable materials.

10. Turning to the question of security guarantees, he recalled that, as a result of their accession to the non-proliferation Treaty, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus had received security guarantees from the nuclear-weapon States. Belarus assumed from that development that the nuclear Powers were prepared to intensify their efforts to put in place a new safeguards regime. It welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and statements by the nuclear Powers granting security guarantees to non-nuclear States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, and looked forward to follow-up action in that direction. Existing and emerging nuclear-weapon-free zones had an important contribution to make to consolidating the non-proliferation regime. As early as 1990, Belarus had proposed the creation of such a zone in Central Europe. With Ukraine's recent decision to become a non-nuclear-weapon State, the prerequisites for implementing that proposal could be said to exist. Belarus was somewhat concerned, however, about the possible risk of more and more European territory being used for nuclear weapons deployment if NATO were to be expanded geographically.

11. Belarus believed that the entry into force of the START I Treaty had lifted all barriers to ratification of the START II Treaty by the Russian Federation and the United States of America and hoped that a speedy solution would be found to that problem. It attached considerable importance to keeping the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty alive as a cornerstone of strategic stability and was involved in the negotiations on its future.

12. Realizing the importance of eliminating such inhumane weapons of mass destruction as chemical weapons, Belarus had signed and ratified in February 1995 the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

13. Belarus greatly appreciated the safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the basis for the nuclear non-proliferation regime and believed that the Agency should be strengthened. The delayed disclosure of "clandestine" nuclear programmes in some States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty testified to the need for better control mechanisms to prevent any diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful to military purposes.

14. A mechanism was therefore needed for detecting unreported nuclear activity. Such a mechanism might include free access to reported facilities, along with the possibility of inspecting any other facilities. IAEA was known to be subject to financial constraints because of the increase in the volume of nuclear materials and the number of power plants subject to safeguards. Belarus believed that nuclear States could increase their contribution to financing the safeguards system. In the final analysis, the costs involved were minimal compared with the benefits that States would enjoy in terms of greater international security.

15. Because 70 per cent of the radioactive waste released by the Chernobyl disaster had fallen on its territory, Belarus had learnt the bitter lesson of the fatal consequences of radioactive contamination. Since those consequences were similar to the consequences of a nuclear attack, it wished to issue a warning to those States that might be envisaging the use of nuclear weapons. The consequences of such an action were too horrible for anyone to seek to possess such weapons. Belarus knew from experience that, once confronted with the consequences of a nuclear holocaust, a State could not count on receiving effective outside assistance. That was why it was insisting on the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime and the indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty.

16. Mr. van MIERLO (Netherlands) expressed satisfaction that, since 1990, some 30 States, including two nuclear-weapon States, had acceded to the Treaty, which, with 175 States parties, had become nearly universal. There was no doubt that the Treaty had turned out to be the most successful global security treaty since the world had entered the nuclear age. The question facing the Conference was therefore whether the Treaty, which had served well in the relatively stable world of the cold war, would continue to serve well in a less predictable future. His country's answer to that question was yes, for it saw the Treaty as providing the necessary framework for nuclear disarmament, durable disarmament and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Netherlands therefore favoured the unconditional extension of the Treaty for an indefinite period, since that course of action would best serve those purposes.

17. The non-proliferation Treaty was unique in many respects. First, its duration had not been unlimited from the outset. Second, it intentionally created inequality between the nuclear haves and have-nots. And lastly, it provided for a linkage between nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful cooperation.

18. The only global legal instrument aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Treaty had been highly successful in preventing additional States beyond the five declared nuclear Powers at the time of its conclusion from acquiring nuclear weapons. The fears that existed when the Treaty had been concluded had not come to pass and, at least, the number of nuclear States was the same as in 1968.

19. The very welcome increase in the number of parties to the Treaty should not give rise to complacency; the ultimate goal was universal adherence to the Treaty. The Conference could contribute to the achievement of that goal by sending a strong signal to States which had not yet acceded to the Treaty or

even accepted its norms. Making the Treaty permanent would be just such a signal.

20. Out of their overriding concern to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, the signatories to the Treaty had accepted a temporary inequality between the nuclear haves and have-nots. That unusual provision had been agreed to because all the parties had realized that, whatever their status, it was in their common interest and that their determination to reduce nuclear weapons and proceed to disarmament would ultimately do away with that inequality.

21. After reviewing the considerable progress made in recent years in the area of disarmament, he pointed out that, under the START I and START II Treaties, the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation would soon be reduced by two thirds.

22. In the current favourable climate, the five nuclear-weapon States should actively engage in further arms control and disarmament negotiations. Security Council resolution 984 (1995), adopted on 11 April 1995, provided the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty with security assurances and solemnly reaffirmed the obligation of the nuclear-weapon States to pursue negotiations in good faith leading to nuclear disarmament. The progressive implementation of article VI of the Treaty, dealing with nuclear disarmament, had become more feasible than ever and the world could look forward to a day when a complete nuclear disarmament would be a reality.

23. The Netherlands fully supported the negotiations under way in Geneva on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and noted with satisfaction that the talks begun in January 1994 had made significant progress. However, there were still intricate political and technical issues to be solved. The current negotiations should be concluded quickly so that the world would finally see an end to all nuclear testing. The start of negotiations on a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive purposes was another positive development. Progress on those two fronts would further strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

24. Turning to the question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, he said that efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons should not keep the non-nuclear-weapon States from benefiting from civilian nuclear technology, which could play an important role in improving the quality of life. The experience with civilian nuclear cooperation had perhaps been disappointing to some States. The overriding reason for that was growing scepticism about the possibility of benefiting from nuclear energy in an ecologically and economically sound and sustainable manner. Such scepticism was felt in the industrialized and the developing world alike. His country was for its part, reappraising the role of nuclear energy in its national industry. That did not mean that the beneficial impact of nuclear technology on people's everyday lives should be forgotten, but it was important to note the limitations to the use of the atom.

25. The challenge embodied in the non-proliferation Treaty was to make sure that no nuclear technology or material, once transferred for peaceful purposes, was diverted for military applications. In that connection, he wholeheartedly

supported the statement by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency the preceding day and fully supported the efforts being made in Vienna to strengthen the existing safeguards regime through "Programme 93 + 2".

26. A strengthened safeguards regime and the extension of the non-proliferation Treaty for an indefinite period would not hamper peaceful nuclear cooperation between States. On the contrary, it would create a climate of confidence in which such cooperation would be able to flourish.

27. That was precisely why his delegation urged the Conference to accept the principle of the application of full-scope safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities, in nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. That measure should become the cornerstone of the future nuclear non-proliferation regime under the non-proliferation Treaty. The discussions at the Conference would, no doubt, be intense, perhaps sometimes acrimonious, but at last it seemed that it was possible not only to establish a stable non-proliferation regime but also to further the Treaty's other objectives, especially in the sphere of disarmament. His delegation did not believe that there was a conflict of interest between North and South, or between rich and poor countries, all of which had a common destiny and the same basic security interests. Extending the Treaty for an unlimited period would not only make life difficult for potential proliferators, but would also create the necessary conditions for further nuclear disarmament. The other side of the coin was that any uncertainty over the future of the Treaty could dampen the willingness of the nuclear-weapon States to further reduce their nuclear arsenals. The parties would in fact be the ones to suffer from such a situation.

28. The nuclear disarmament process that had started in the past decade must, obviously, go on. The inequality between nuclear haves and nuclear have-nots that was inherent in the Treaty was a source of tension and could not last in the long run. In that connection, the Treaty placed a heavy moral responsibility on the nuclear-weapon States.

29. Mr. HURD (United Kingdom) said that, although the cold war was now over, the risks posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction had not faded. The non-proliferation Treaty lay at the heart of efforts to deal with those risks, and it should be placed on solid, permanent foundations. Needless to say, the Treaty had its imperfections, but none of them was a fatal flaw. The best way to rid the world of the fear of nuclear war was to extend the Treaty unconditionally and indefinitely. Although the circumstances in which the Treaty had been devised had changed, the Treaty had preserved its relevance. Mere exhortation of the States parties was no use; there was a need to look at the Treaty's imperfections, whether real or perceived. His delegation did not believe that they were major obstacles.

30. The Treaty recognized the existence of only five nuclear-weapon States. That might seem discriminatory, but it had to be borne in mind that, 25 years earlier, the Treaty had had to recognize the real position if it was to prevent further nuclear proliferation. At that time proliferation had appeared unstoppable. Well over 20 States had been thought eager to acquire nuclear weapons and it was largely because the Treaty had drawn a firm distinction

between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States that nuclear proliferation had been contained.

31. As for the criticisms of nuclear disarmament, the continued existence of nuclear weapons should not obscure the fact that considerable progress had been achieved. The Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and the two START Treaties had consigned thousands of nuclear warheads to elimination. Unilateral decisions had also been taken to reduce stockpiles. The United Kingdom was not lagging behind, but had steadily proceeded with its own reductions. Its nuclear forces would soon be limited to a single system deployed on submarines. At the end of the current decade, the total number of British warheads would be 21 per cent less than in the 1970s and their explosive power 59 per cent lower, which represented a reduction of three fifths. If the world had seen cuts of that order in other types of weapons, it would be a safer and more stable place.

32. The United Kingdom nevertheless understood the fears of some countries. In order to allay them, it had, together with other nuclear-weapon States, offered strengthened security assurances. It was committed to negotiating measures which would impose severe constraints on nuclear weapons and hoped that an effective and verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty would soon be concluded. To that end, it had accepted that there should be no exemption for tests in exceptional circumstances or safety tests. It also hoped that there would be an early start to the negotiations on an agreement to cut off the production of fissile materials for military purposes. In order to remove any doubts that there might be, he announced that the United Kingdom had ceased the production of fissile material for explosive purposes.

33. The United Kingdom programme for the reduction of nuclear forces which he had outlined meant that, when the START II Treaty was implemented, British nuclear forces would be considerably less than 10 per cent of the total United States and Russian nuclear forces. There was, however, no doubt that, in a world in which those forces were counted in hundreds rather than the current thousands, the United Kingdom would respond to the challenge of multilateral talks on the global reduction of nuclear arms.

34. The nuclear disarmament he had described could only have taken place in the framework of stability and predictability which the Treaty had helped to establish. In order to build further on the momentum created by recent successes and by the negotiations in progress or in prospect, it was important to ensure that the framework provided by the Treaty was made permanent.

35. Turning to the question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, he noted that some deplored the fact that those uses had not developed as rapidly as they had expected. Nuclear power had, however, spread widely around the world and nuclear energy had found various applications in fields of particular interest to developing countries, such as medicine and agriculture. All that would not have been possible without the non-proliferation Treaty and the IAEA safeguards. It would take several decades to secure a return on investment in major civilian nuclear projects. A predictable and certain non-proliferation Treaty was therefore essential if international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was to be increased.

36. Some were concerned about export controls. However, the fact that certain items were subject to controls did not mean that their export was prohibited. The controls in question affected only countries such as Iran, about whose ultimate intentions there were widespread doubts. Suppliers must be careful; they would be rightly criticized if they were not.

37. The United Kingdom constantly urged all States which were not parties to the Treaty to allay suspicions about their nuclear activities and accede to the Treaty at the earliest opportunity. Progress had been made. He welcomed the fact that Algeria, Argentina, South Africa and all the successor States to the Soviet Union had become parties to the Treaty.

38. It was not impossible that Israel, India and Pakistan might one day accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. Some States which had once condemned the Treaty were, indeed, now parties to it. Unrelenting pressure and persuasion could perhaps achieve the same result with others. Such efforts would not succeed, however, if the decisions taken at the Conference displayed a lack of commitment to the Treaty.

39. It was also important to ensure that States which had acceded to the Treaty complied with its provisions. In that connection, the scale of Iraq's clandestine nuclear-weapons programme had been a salutary shock for all. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had presented a problem and many were anxious about Iran. Those dangers were all the more reason to strengthen, rather than despair of, the control system established under the Treaty. The United Nations Special Commission and IAEA were dealing with the Iraqi problem and the Agreed Framework signed in October 1994 offered a way of resolving the problem of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea within the framework of the Treaty.

40. The international community had also recognized the need to strengthen the safeguards system of IAEA and to provide the latter with all the support it needed through the Security Council. His delegation welcomed the Agency's latest proposals for strengthening safeguards and looked forward to early agreement on their implementation. The statement made by the President of the Security Council at the summit meeting of the Council held in January 1992, to the effect that the members of the Security Council would take appropriate measures in the case of any violations of safeguards agreements, also considerably reinforced confidence in the Treaty.

41. To sum up, it was important to look beyond the technicalities and recognize the benefits of the non-proliferation Treaty. Despite the threats to peace and stability in the world, the Treaty had made it possible to avert the threat of a nuclear war and the risk of uncontrolled nuclear proliferation. It was important to preserve what had been achieved and make the Treaty a permanent feature of international life.

42. The indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty was the right decision because it would reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation with its destabilizing consequences, reinforce the momentum towards nuclear disarmament, provide the continuing framework essential to international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and send a clear signal to those few countries

which had not yet acceded to the Treaty that the international community expected them to do so. Lastly, a decision to that effect would demonstrate to all - including those tempted to follow the route of proliferation - that the world community remained determined to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and the horrors inherent therein. The non-proliferation Treaty deserved the biggest vote of confidence, which it would well repay.

43. Mr. SOLANA (Spain) noted that the current international context was substantially - and happily - different from what it had been in 1970, when the Treaty had been born. The threat of nuclear war had disappeared, nuclear arsenals had been considerably reduced and international cooperation encouraged the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Serious dangers had, however, also emerged, such as the first cases of illicit trafficking in fissile materials and violations of the international system established to guarantee compliance with the Treaty. The French delegation had expressed the common point of view of the European Union on the matter. His delegation wished to discuss some points in greater detail.

44. Although since the previous Review Conference in 1990 more than 30 States had become parties to the Treaty, the refusal of some countries to accede to it gave rise to considerable regional imbalances and situations of clear inequality on a global scale. Given the incalculable risk which the proliferation of nuclear weapons represented for mankind as a whole, only universality could make the Treaty an effective instrument in the fight against that terrible danger. Spain therefore earnestly hoped that the international situation would soon be such that it would allow the accession of all States without exception.

45. With regard to safeguards, Spain believed that the Treaty also required a system to monitor compliance. Through its system of inspections, IAEA had proved to be the best guarantor of international security. It was essential to recognize, however, that that system was not infallible, as had been demonstrated by the discovery of the nuclear programmes in Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which should be a clear warning for the future.

46. Spain was therefore convinced that it was necessary to strengthen the safeguards system and to support the efforts being made by the Director-General of IAEA to ensure that inspections without prior notice and access to strategic areas during routine inspections were allowed. It also hoped that new types of safeguards agreements would be concluded which would reinforce the Agency's responsibilities and go beyond the legal prejudices and outdated concepts of sovereignty. If the Treaty was to be effective, it must be provided with a system to control the export of nuclear material and technology that would allow commercial and technological exchanges under the necessary security guarantees. Spain, which was a member of the Zangger Committee and had recently presided over the Nuclear Suppliers Group, considered that the latter was not a closed group of States bent on obstructing legitimate international trade. On the contrary, it advocated the gradual and cautious enlargement of that Group so that States which were suppliers of nuclear equipment, material and technology and subscribed to the Group's fundamental principles would assume the same obligations as its other members. That had been the case with Argentina, New Zealand and South Africa.

47. The existence of export controls was not incompatible with cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Spain had always sought to promote economic development throughout the world, and it felt that nuclear energy should not be the exclusive privilege of a small group of States. It had recently signed 12 such cooperation agreements, thus contributing to the legitimate right of the least developed countries to have access to advanced technology. It had also financed, wholly or in part, 60 international projects through IAEA and, between 1989 and 1994, had dispatched 300 experts to Latin American and East European countries, where they were collaborating in the development of nuclear energy.

48. Turning to disarmament, he recalled the progress made in the post-cold-war period - the agreements on the reduction of nuclear arsenals, ratification of the START I Treaty, the accession by Ukraine to the non-proliferation Treaty - and called for prompt ratification of the START II Treaty noting that it would be a further step towards the ambitious objective set forth in article VI of the Treaty, namely, the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control. He also called for the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga were magnificent examples of what could be done to combat proliferation when States of varying dimensions combined their efforts to build a safer world. Spain supported the ongoing efforts to establish the African continent and the Middle East as zones free of weapons of mass destruction.

49. Spain had learned with deep concern of the recent cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear material. That was a serious problem which affected the entire international community and it was essential that the process of dismantling nuclear weapons, which was one of the outstanding results of the new disarmament agreements, should be subject to strict control. In the multilateral area, the International Atomic Energy Agency was the most suitable forum for designing a strategy to combat such illicit trafficking; such a strategy was not incompatible with the efforts being made in other regional organizations.

50. Spain welcomed the willingness shown by the nuclear Powers to conclude a treaty banning all nuclear tests and to accompany it with an effective verification system. That must continue to be the highest priority of the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva. Spain for its part was an active observer of that Conference and it was already participating in the vast network of nuclear tests detection systems known as GSETT-III. It also wished to cooperate in the conclusion of a treaty for the cut-off of fissile material production.

51. Regarding assurances, Spain noted that, for years, a large number of signatory States to the Treaty had quite rightly, been demanding greater commitment from the nuclear Powers on the question of positive and negative security assurances. Security Council resolution 984 (1995), which had been adopted unanimously on 11 April, marked a qualitative step forward in that respect since, for the first time in history, the five nuclear Powers had jointly given positive and negative security assurances to the States that were parties to the Treaty.

52. Finally, he said that the efforts to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons could not be limited in time and that the international community could

not afford the luxury of periodically reviewing the essence of the Treaty. Spain was therefore convinced that the Treaty must be indefinitely and unconditionally extended. It had been argued that that would deprive some States of an important means of persuasion in the efforts to promote disarmament. To that Spain replied that the best way of achieving general and complete disarmament was precisely to ensure that the provision set forth in article VI of the Treaty remained in effect indefinitely. Likewise, only by extending article IV would it be possible to continue the cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

53. Mr. OUELLET (Canada) said that the discussions at the Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, one of the most successful international treaties ever, would take place against the backdrop of a growing world consensus in favour of halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons on the one hand, and denuclearization on the other hand. By signing the Treaty, 176 countries had already affirmed their commitment to the universal norms and principles on which it was based. There was no doubt that the international community must work to achieve the ultimate goal of universalization. Canada, for its part, hoped that the commitment would become a permanent reality and that the non-proliferation Treaty would be indefinitely and unconditionally extended.

54. The attitude of the Canadian Government to the Conference was shaped by a number of realities: first, Canada had taken a political decision, very early on, not to use either its skills or its technical capacities to produce nuclear weapons. Secondly, Canada was one of the leading proponents of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Finally, true to its long-standing commitment to multilateralism, Canada wished to strengthen the United Nations and international norms and principles in order to build a comprehensive and universal security framework for the twenty-first century. That presupposed universal adhesion to the key instruments on non-proliferation, namely, the Treaty under consideration and also the chemical weapons Convention, the biological and toxin weapons Convention and the Convention on certain conventional weapons, which regulated the use of land mines. In addition, it would be necessary to strengthen respect for legality by establishing a framework of international treaties on non-proliferation and disarmament. Any allegations based erroneously on possible limitations of sovereignty must be refuted by noting the tangible progress accomplished in the area of security.

55. Canada appreciated the opportunity that presented itself every five years to review the operation of the Treaty and considered that that opportunity should be further enhanced. The aim should be not only to facilitate consideration of the implementation of provisions of the Treaty but also to strengthen the achievement of its objectives.

56. Reviewing what had been achieved in the 25 years since the Treaty came into force, he recalled that one of the first objectives was, and remained, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries other than the five nuclear Powers of the post-war era. It could be said that the Treaty had achieved that goal. Indeed, at the time the Treaty came into effect, it had been feared that there might be some 25 countries with a nuclear arsenal by the time the Treaty came up for review in 1995. In fact that had not happened. Of course, the

threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons had not disappeared: it was just as real as it had been in 1970.

57. Non-proliferation was not the Treaty's sole objective; it also established fundamental, lasting norms and principles governing the conduct of those in possession of nuclear material and authorized the utilization of nuclear energy for purposes of economic development. Under article III signatories were required to conclude safeguard agreements for the purpose of verifying that nuclear material was not diverted from peaceful uses to other purposes. In that connection, Canada strongly encouraged the States parties to the Treaty to support the International Atomic Energy Agency's Programme "93+2", which helped to improve the transparency and to strengthen the assurance of the peaceful use of nuclear energy by providing for mechanisms to detect clandestine weapons activities. Article III also provided for the establishment of supplementary mechanisms such as export controls. The safeguards and export controls were mutually reinforcing and together provided assurance that nations were not secretly preparing nuclear-weapons programmes. Thus all States, even the non-signatories, benefited from the resulting security.

58. Under article IV all parties were entitled to benefit from the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and nuclear technology. On that score, the results were conclusive, for a growing number of States parties to NPT were using nuclear energy to strengthen their economies.

59. Article VII dealt with the legal right to establish nuclear-free zones. Those agreements did much to strengthen the security of signatory States and Canada saw that as another positive element of regional and international security.

60. The Treaty provided for a dynamic process of negotiations to halt the nuclear-arms race and to undertake nuclear disarmament. More than that, it established a radical agenda which would result in a treaty on "general and complete disarmament under strict and effective control". In assessing the Treaty's effectiveness with regard to article VI, it was first necessary to recognize and to welcome the fact that among the States which were parties to the Treaty, the nuclear arms race had virtually ended. Russia and the United States continued to make bold steps to reduce their nuclear arsenals. The arms race had given way to a joint bilateral undertaking for nuclear disarmament. Other nuclear-weapon States had made unilateral cuts in their nuclear arsenals.

61. That had all been done against the backdrop of security calculations which had begun with the Treaty. Canada was convinced that it was the framework of stability, security and predictability provided by the Treaty that had made progress on nuclear-arms control and disarmament possible. For that reason those in favour of radical disarmament should be the strongest proponents of the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

62. Under the broad security guarantees provided for in the Treaty, certain initiatives of vital importance had been taken. First, negotiations were under way for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Canada was encouraged by the work to date and believed that such a treaty would in time become a reality. It hoped

that the nuclear-weapon States would refrain from testing during the negotiations.

63. Second, building on the momentum of those negotiations and reflecting States' political will to make progress in disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament had on 23 March 1995 adopted the important decision to begin negotiations on a convention to prohibit the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons.

64. Third, the nuclear-weapon States had taken significant steps with their recent declarations on security assurances. Such assurances, like the further extension of nuclear-weapon-free zones, were important confidence-building measures which were in every State's security interest.

65. Further, the leading nuclear-weapon States had recommitted themselves to their obligations under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty, an initiative that sent a powerful message in behalf of future disarmament.

66. Canada believed that the non-proliferation Treaty offered security guarantees that were essential for nuclear disarmament, and it was important to perpetuate the Treaty indefinitely. Future review conferences would provide States parties with the opportunity every five years to strengthen compliance with article VI and the other provisions of the Treaty. There was simply no substitute for the non-proliferation Treaty, whose benefits for non-nuclear-weapon States were invaluable.

67. Canada believed that the only way to ensure that the Treaty remained in force was to extend it indefinitely. That meant enshrining, permanently, the legal commitment of States to dismantle all nuclear arsenals. The Treaty was the only multilateral legal instrument to contain such an injunction. Without it, the international community would have nothing, even if some claimed that countries could not be forced into following timetables and meeting goals that they had had no role in developing.

68. In conclusion, he said that the States parties to the Treaty had the political responsibility to take a decision that responded to present realities and positioned them to meet future challenges. The Treaty, with its flexibility, was the States parties' instrument for promoting and achieving nuclear disarmament. Canada and the other States parties were committed to both elements of the Treaty - non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament - which called for a firm political decision in favour of indefinite and unconditional extension.

69. Mr. IBRAHIM (Indonesia) said that any decision on the extension of the Treaty should reflect the results of the review of its implementation. It would therefore be useful to assess the functioning of the Treaty.

70. In 1975, at the First Review Conference, the depositary States and their allies had categorically rejected several basic demands of the non-nuclear countries. They included a comprehensive test ban, an end to the increase of strategic arsenals, efforts to prevent both horizontal and vertical

proliferation, a timetable for nuclear-arms control and assurances of non-use of nuclear weapons - all intended to redress the imbalances in the Treaty.

71. The non-nuclear-weapon States had argued that the nuclear Powers had not lived up to their commitments, since the pace of the nuclear-arms race had actually accelerated. Hence, they had called for a thorough examination of the operation of the Treaty to determine whether all its provisions were being implemented and to remedy any inadequacies in that regard. They had also pointed out that non-parties to the Treaty had benefited considerably more from the transfer of nuclear technology and equipment than parties to the Treaty. They had therefore sought increased assistance in the use of such technology, but the depositary States had ignored their grievances. With great foresight, they had also called for a suspension of all nuclear tests for a period of 10 years and a reduction of nuclear arsenals by 50 per cent.

72. At the Second Review Conference, in 1980, the question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy had emerged as the overriding issue. With the establishment in 1977 of the extra-Treaty mechanism - the Nuclear Suppliers Group - the implementation of articles III and IV of the Treaty had rested effectively with the suppliers or had been governed by bilateral agreements. The non-nuclear-weapon States had declared that there should be no threats to impose more stringent restrictions or safeguards. They had also opposed the imposition of unilateral conditions on nuclear exports beyond the safeguards required by IAEA. But none of the requests made by the non-nuclear-weapon States for negotiations concerning storage, use and management of fissionable material had materialized.

73. In 1985, during the Third Review Conference, the depositary States had contended that the resumption of the Geneva negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons had been in itself evidence of their "good faith". In reality, the level of weapons of mass destruction had greatly risen and the arms race had been extended into outer space. Thus, prospects for genuine reductions had receded. The Fourth Review Conference had been convened in 1990 against the background of a profoundly changed international political situation. It had achieved consensus on a wide range of recommendations concerning the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation, safeguards, establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It had not, however, succeeded in arriving at a consensus on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race, while the responsibility of adopting an instrument on a complete cessation of nuclear testing had been left to the two super-Powers.

74. Thus, it was evident that, during the 25 years of its existence, the Treaty had not functioned as originally intended and had not met the expectations of the majority of the States parties. Furthermore, the inequalities between the nuclear-weapon States and the others had been accentuated, with the former preserving their rights and privileges while relegating the non-nuclear-weapon States to the position of sole bearers of obligations under the Treaty.

75. While advances had undoubtedly been made in nuclear-arms limitations, they had not gone far enough. The two nuclear super-Powers should negotiate an agreement on a timetable for a drastic cut in nuclear weapons far below the

level of that provided for under the START II Treaty. A strengthened non-proliferation Treaty would involve a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, prohibition of the production of weapons-grade fissionable materials and the elimination of nuclear arsenals.

76. In the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, cooperation should be fostered on an assured and predictable basis. States parties to the Treaty must be given preferential access to nuclear technology. Export-control regimes should be replaced by multilateral agreements that were more responsive to the development needs of the non-nuclear countries.

77. Concurrently, IAEA should become an efficacious instrument for building a broader framework for international cooperation by extending technical assistance without restraints and based on regionally agreed priorities. Safeguards should be functional, objective, universal and non-discriminatory.

78. The question of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States had been one of the central issues in the negotiations leading to the non-proliferation Treaty. The recent declarations issued by the nuclear Powers had failed to assuage the apprehensions of non-nuclear-weapon States, which had long demanded legally binding commitments. Unilateral pledges of that type did not contain adequate guarantees, since they left ample room for subjective interpretation and, since they were made unilaterally, they could also be unilaterally withdrawn in the event of hostilities. States which had renounced the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons had the inherent right to receive unconditional and legally binding assurances.

79. Indonesia had always attached great importance to article VII of the Treaty, which affirmed the right of all States to conclude regional treaties to ensure their security. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, freely arrived at by the States of the region, would foster peace, stability and security. Furthermore, such zones would also contribute to the objectives of the Treaty by curbing the spread of nuclear weapons. The endeavours to establish South-East Asia as a nuclear-weapon-free zone were encouraging.

80. With regard to the extension of the Treaty, he recalled that article X, paragraph 2, required parties to choose among three options. In his delegation's view, indefinite extension of the Treaty would legitimize nuclear weapons and permit the five nuclear Powers to keep their arsenals while denying others the right to acquire them. That would ratify inequality in international relations once and for all, and relegate the non-nuclear countries to second-class status. The second option would mean the eventual expiry of the Treaty, which was not desirable.

81. The third option, providing for extension for successive periods, would be conducive to the advancement of the disarmament objectives set forth in the preamble and in article VI. The nuclear-weapon States would be obligated to conclude specific agreements leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Those measures would form an integral part of the decision to extend the Treaty, or would be the subject of separate binding agreements whose fulfilment or non-fulfilment would be reviewed by the States parties on a regular basis. Such an approach would have the advantage of linking the

successive extensions of the Treaty to its application. Moreover, that option constituted a reasonable compromise between indefinite extension and extension for a single period, and would be in the interests of all States Parties to the Treaty.

82. The attainment of the Treaty's objectives would be largely dependent on the way in which the nuclear-weapon States lived up to their commitments. The Treaty was not an end in itself, but a means to the objective of nuclear disarmament. For the majority of States, it was the only instrument for stemming proliferation, promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and eliminating all nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.

83. Mr. ALEXANDROV (Bulgaria) said that encouraging progress had been made in curbing the nuclear-arms race, as was apparent from the various treaties he listed. In his view, it was the Treaty under discussion which was responsible for that favourable climate.

84. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had for 25 years been preventing the spread of nuclear weapons: thus more than 30 States had become parties to it, including two nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear countries such as Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine.

85. The Treaty was also the core of an effective system of safeguards and controls. International cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would hardly have been possible without a legally binding commitment to non-proliferation. The IAEA safeguards ensured that nuclear materials were not diverted for military purposes. His Government highly appreciated the efforts made by the Agency to promote international cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy and in combating proliferation.

86. With regard to the extension of the Treaty, Bulgaria's position had been set forth in the statement made by its Minister for Foreign Affairs on 14 April 1985: it was in favour of indefinite and unconditional extension. His delegation therefore fully associated itself with the statement made by the French delegation on behalf of the European Union and the associated States. Bulgaria was sincerely committed to the efforts of the international community to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and eliminate them. There were no nuclear, chemical or biological weapons in its territory. The non-proliferation Treaty should, in its view, become a permanent factor in international relations. It was a guarantee of the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament and provided a framework for continuing the efforts to bring about a world free from nuclear weapons.

87. That said, his delegation believed that the international community should seek rapid progress on a number of other issues. First, a nuclear-test-ban treaty and an agreement to halt the production of fissile material for military purposes should be speedily elaborated by the Conference on Disarmament. Next, the nuclear Powers should commit themselves firmly to refraining from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. In that context, Bulgaria welcomed the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 984 (1995), which afforded an appropriate point of departure for negotiating a future

legally binding international instrument on the provision of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Lastly, the IAEA safeguards system should be strengthened, inter alia, by on-site and random inspections to prevent diversion of nuclear materials, equipment and technology for military purposes. Further steps should also be taken in relation to export controls, protection, accounting and control of fissile materials, and prevention of environmental degradation.

88. Mr. KONO (Japan) said that the decision to be taken by the Conference regarding the extension of the Treaty would have a decisive impact on the nature of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and far-reaching implications for the peace and stability of the international community. For that reason, the decision must be taken not only from the national standpoint but also from the perspective of the future of humankind and the entire planet.

89. Japan had ratified the Treaty in 1976, despite vigorous arguments against doing so by those who cited its discriminatory nature. The progress made since then had convinced it that it had made the right choice, for without the Treaty, the number of nuclear-weapons States would certainly be much greater. The nuclear non-proliferation functions of the Treaty had not been without problems, however: some countries had refused to accept the IAEA safeguards regime, some had attempted to acquire further nuclear weapons, and others, which were not parties to the Treaty, were suspected of developing nuclear weapons; lastly, nuclear material had been reported to have been smuggled into Europe in 1994. Nevertheless, the Treaty had become substantially closer to universality since the previous review conference, and he took pleasure in enumerating the new States parties.

90. With regard to the aspects to the treaty relating to disarmament, an objective embodied in article VI, the ending of the cold war had made the situation more promising. The United States of America and the Russian Federation had concluded the START I Treaty and were dismantling their arsenals, and they would, it was hoped, enable the START II Treaty to enter into force soon. Progress had been made in the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Japan was working to facilitate the conclusion of those negotiations, by, for example, making its seismological knowledge available to the international community. In that context, he asked China to join the nuclear test moratorium. Lastly, the countries concerned, among them Japan, were making efforts to launch negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

91. The Treaty also served the purpose of ensuring compatibility between non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Japan, for its part, was promoting nuclear fuel recycling, which entailed shipping material overseas for recycling so as to ensure more efficient use of uranium, a precious and limited resource. In so doing, it complied fully with the standards and guidelines established by the International Maritime Organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

92. Commenting at some length on the role of the Agency, he said that Japan accepted the whole of its safeguards regime, as was indicated by the fact that it had been the first country to publish information on the plutonium in its possession. International cooperation among the States parties to the Treaty in

the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy could be strengthened in accordance with the Treaty, and on the multilateral level, through IAEA. Japan participated in that cooperation by providing personnel and financing for activities under regional agreements covering Asia and the Pacific, and intended to maintain its assistance so as to advance the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA safeguards had played a crucial role at the point of interface between the peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation. While the Treaty did not require them to do so, Japan believed that the nuclear-weapon States should consider voluntarily applying the IAEA safeguards to all their peaceful-use nuclear facilities.

93. Turning next to the issue of the extension of the Treaty, he noted that the ending of the cold war had not freed the world from all uncertainty. Japan therefore concluded that the Treaty should be extended indefinitely. A decision to extend it for fixed periods meant the possibility of its being terminated, and every effort should be made to avoid that eventuality. The nuclear-weapon States, which had reaffirmed their position on security assurances and enabled the Security Council to adopt a resolution on the subject, would undoubtedly participate in the efforts directed towards an indefinite extension.

94. Those States should none the less promote progress in nuclear disarmament. The extension of the Treaty would establish a framework to facilitate such progress. They should bear in mind their obligations under article VI of the Treaty and honour the confidence shown in them by non-nuclear-weapon States, which were in the majority and which had renounced the option of nuclear armament in order to contribute to world peace and stability. Japan had consistently stressed the importance of promoting realistic and steady nuclear disarmament measures, as was proved by the resolution which it had sponsored at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, entitled "Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons", and which had been adopted.

95. In conclusion, the Japanese delegation wished once again to appeal to the States that were not parties to the Treaty to accede to it at the earliest possible date; it also appealed to the nuclear-weapon States to pursue their efforts for disarmament and it appealed to all States to honour their commitments in the field of disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Japan had renounced war as a means of settling international disputes and had consistently worked to promote disarmament, and particularly nuclear disarmament. Having experienced the devastating horror of atomic weapons, it had totally rejected the option of nuclear armament and strictly observed the three nuclear principles of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them, and not permitting their introduction into Japanese territory. Japan's support for the indefinite extension of the Treaty was an outgrowth of that position.

96. Mr. QIAN Qichen (China) said that the year 1995, which marked the fiftieth anniversary of the victory of the anti-Fascist forces and the founding of the United Nations afforded an opportunity to review the past. In fact, nuclear weapons had made their first appearance 50 years earlier and had been used twice. The ensuing cold war, which had been accompanied by the escalating arms race had caused all the world's people to live with the threat of nuclear war

and had adversely affected the socio-economic development of the planet. The cold war had come to an end but huge nuclear arsenals remained. One began to wonder whether mankind, which had been able to invent and manufacture nuclear weapons, was incapable of destroying them completely.

97. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had become the most universal treaty in the field of arms control and had played a positive role in limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Chinese delegation supported the three main objectives of the Treaty, namely, the promotion of nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation and the enhancement of international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It considered that, in the light of the new international situation, it was in the interest of all States parties to reaffirm their commitment to those three objectives, for that could only contribute to the maintenance of peace, security and international stability. However, it realized that the Treaty had its limitations and defects and was in some respects unbalanced, as it set out different rights and obligations for different States parties. However, such inadequacies could be gradually remedied through continued progress in nuclear disarmament and enhanced international cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

98. China supported the extension of the Treaty. It believed that the option of extension for one fixed period was not desirable. However, if the option for indefinite extension was chosen, China believed that it must be made clear that such an extension should in no way be interpreted as perpetuating the prerogatives of the nuclear-weapon States. Should the option for fixed periods be chosen, each fixed period should be no less than 25 years. Whichever option was chosen, the implementation of the Treaty would have to be subject to regular reviews.

99. The Chinese delegation felt that there were more agreements than differences between the States parties to the Treaty. They should therefore be able, through constructive collaboration and by holding intensive consultations, to agree on the extension of the Treaty by consensus. In the meantime, his delegation pointed out that the nuclear-weapon States had the obligation to provide negative and positive security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States, as an essential prerequisite to the extension of the Treaty.

100. The prevention of nuclear-weapon proliferation was not an end in itself but an intermediate step that should lead to the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. In that connection, China's position had not varied and could be summed up in the following manner.

101. First, the primary objective should be a complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. A convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons under effective international supervision should be concluded, as had been done in the case of the conventions banning biological and chemical weapons.

102. Second, pending the conclusion of that convention, measures should be taken to prevent the threat of nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against other States which

also possessed nuclear weapons and should unconditionally undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. Those commitments should be undertaken as soon as possible and, for the sake of greater efficacy, they should be embodied in treaties or international legal instruments.

103. Lastly, a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty should be concluded through negotiations as soon as possible, and not later than 1996. A convention banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear-weapon purposes should also be concluded through negotiations. Those intermediate steps would facilitate the realization of the ultimate goals of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

104. China had never shirked its obligations in the matter of nuclear disarmament. It was the only nuclear-weapon State to have assumed certain unilateral obligations, namely, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against other nuclear-weapon States and not to use or threaten to use these weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

105. China did not endorse the policy of nuclear deterrence, and the nuclear weapons it had developed were solely for self-defence. It had never had any intention of using them to oppose or threaten any country. It had always advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and had never joined in the nuclear-arms race.

106. China had, from the very beginning, exercised restraint in nuclear testing and had conducted fewer nuclear tests than other nuclear-weapon States. Furthermore, it called for the conclusion of a treaty on no-first-use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States. It had proposed a draft treaty on those lines to the other four nuclear-weapon States. Lastly, China and Russia had issued a joint statement undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other and to detarget their respective nuclear weapons away from each other.

107. China welcomed the adoption, on 11 April, of resolution 984 (1995) of the Security Council on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and it hoped that unconditional security assurances would be provided to all non-nuclear-weapon States at an early date in the form of an international legal instrument. On 5 April 1995 it had issued a statement reaffirming its unconditional negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States and undertaking to provide positive security assurances to those States. The Chinese Government had also issued statements concerning the provision of security assurances to Ukraine and Khazakstan, at their request.

108. China supported the efforts made by the countries and regions concerned to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones or zones free of weapons of mass destruction through voluntary consultations. Under the Additional Protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga, which it had signed respectively in 1973 and 1987, it had undertaken specific commitments to the nuclear-weapon-free zones of Latin America, the Caribbean and the South Pacific. It accordingly welcomed the efforts made by the African countries to conclude a treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. Lastly, China was making positive efforts

to facilitate the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and supported the negotiation and conclusion of a convention banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear-weapon purposes.

109. In order to realize the objective of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, it was necessary for the international community to prevent the proliferation of weapons of that kind. China supported the principle of the universality of the Treaty and hoped that the safeguards system of IAEA would be more rational and effective. It had consistently pursued a policy of not endorsing or encouraging nuclear-weapon proliferation. It had always refrained from engaging in activities that would promote such proliferation and it had never helped other countries to manufacture nuclear weapons. With regard to nuclear exports, it adhered to three principles. First, exports should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes; second, exports should be subject to IAEA safeguards; thirdly, exports should not be retransferred to a third country without China's consent. All Chinese nuclear exports were subject to IAEA safeguards.

110. China believed that the promotion of international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy was important in fulfilling Treaty obligations and that it deserved the same attention as other provisions of the Treaty. The prevention of nuclear-weapon proliferation should facilitate the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by the developing countries and should help them to exercise their legitimate rights in that respect. In preventing nuclear-weapon proliferation or utilizing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, it was inadmissible to apply a double standard.

111. China, a developing country with some nuclear industry capabilities, conducted a policy of international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It had engaged in cooperation and fruitful exchanges with IAEA and had signed bilateral cooperation agreements with 14 countries.

112. With the advent of the twenty-first century it was to be hoped that mankind could finally rid itself of the nuclear threat and that nuclear energy could be harnessed for the benefit of all. His country was ready to work towards that objective.

113. Mr. UDOVENKO (Ukraine) said that the results of the Conference would have a lasting effect on nuclear geopolitics and would influence the evolution of military-political strategy and the national legislation of the States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty.

114. With reference to the "Ukrainian nuclear question", he said that the issue had attracted too many political speculations and that too many unjust accusations had been levelled at Ukraine, whose position was obviously misunderstood and whose legitimate concerns and balanced and constructive proposals had not been taken into account. Ukraine found itself in a unique situation: it had inherited the world's third largest nuclear potential and at the same time was the first State to declare voluntarily, even before the break-up of the former USSR, its desire to become a non-nuclear State. That was a historic step, which retained its importance even after Ukraine had ratified the

START I Treaty and acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty, a step which should contribute to the success of the Conference.

115. While the discovery of the secrets of the atom and nuclear applications had been the triumph of science, the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the terror of nuclear catastrophe and clearly pointed to the need for a global non-proliferation regime for nuclear weapons. Ukraine had been deeply traumatized by the Chernobyl disaster and was particularly interested in cooperating closely with the international community to prevent further tragedies of the kind. The establishment of IAEA, the institution of the system of safeguards, the conclusion of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, and the entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty had become the first important international steps in that direction.

116. From the outset, the non-proliferation Treaty had received the support of the majority of States. Although it was one of the cold-war treaties and not ideal, it was nevertheless an important starting-point for nuclear disarmament. Therefore, in determining its future, it was important to keep in mind that in international practice there neither was nor could be an absolute or perfect solution. Since the existing international non-proliferation regime had in principle proved its usefulness, the aim should no doubt be to improve the norms incorporated in that regime and to develop new mechanisms for their implementation.

117. The end of the cold war had significantly altered the geopolitical map of the world and was opening up new prospects for the peaceful settlement of conflicts. The non-proliferation Treaty was the key instrument in the field of arms control and disarmament because, by regulating the problems of nuclear security, it allowed countries to develop future policies in the sphere of nuclear disarmament and enabled non-nuclear States to conduct an equal and effective dialogue with nuclear States on measures aimed at strengthening the existing non-proliferation regime and on specific steps in the direction of general and complete disarmament. In order to ensure the effective halting of the nuclear-arms race and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Conference must concentrate on the development of additional prevention mechanisms. That would involve an in-depth analysis of the underlying causes of those phenomena. At the same time, it was important to develop international incentives to promote nuclear disarmament.

118. That said, Ukraine, although in favour of an indefinite extension of the Treaty, was prepared to consider all possible ways of solving the remaining disagreements, making the Treaty more effective and improving the existing non-proliferation regime. At the same time, it stressed the instability of a situation created by the existence, on the one hand, of States which based their security on the possession of nuclear weapons and, on the other, of threshold States and countries which had either never possessed nuclear weapons or had voluntarily relinquished them. It was obvious to everyone that the use of nuclear weapons would be fatal for human civilization. Moreover, the end of the cold war and the resulting new political realities had forced States to develop more sophisticated military doctrines. The very concept of security was changing, and whatever was necessary should be done to ensure that the

principles of indivisible and collective security which were being incorporated into the foundation of the external policy of States should find practical applications. In that regard, Ukraine would welcome the confirmation of the obligations undertaken by all nuclear-weapon States parties under article VI of the Treaty. The international community had a right to expect the parties to ratify the START II Treaty promptly. The willingness of the United Kingdom, France and China to take part in the negotiations on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons could be more definitely reflected in the final act of the Conference.

119. Ukraine had proved to the whole world that its policy with respect to nuclear disarmament was consistent. It had, for example, participated in the implementation of the INF Treaty and the START I Treaty, and in spite of considerable social and economic difficulties, it had consistently fulfilled its obligations, because it was aware of the decisive importance of disarmament questions. Other States, both nuclear and non-nuclear, would significantly contribute to those efforts by providing more substantial support to Ukraine.

120. The question of complete security assurances being granted by the nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty remained one of the most pressing problems in the context of the Treaty's implementation. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) on security assurances, which had been adopted unanimously on 11 April, demonstrated that the dialogue between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States was progressing and should be regarded as a further step towards a universal international legal document. The experience of countries which had signed the Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons indicated that there was a real opportunity to prepare an instrument which would reflect all aspects of the current world. It was known that the elaboration of the Memorandum had played a key role in Ukraine's accession to the Treaty. Although it concerned the situation of Ukraine, the Memorandum contained a number of ideas that could be helpful to the international community and thereby foster the existing non-proliferation regime.

121. The majority of States parties recognized the Treaty's importance. Unfortunately, the positive shifts which had occurred at the Geneva negotiations were not sufficient, as the remaining differences on substantive issues attested. If the negotiations were really to move forward, all the nuclear-weapon States must declare a moratorium on nuclear tests.

122. His delegation welcomed the progress achieved at the beginning of 1995 during the negotiations on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for military purposes. However, the outcome of the negotiations was still far in the future, given that the task was not a simple one.

123. Among the efforts to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime, improvement of the IAEA safeguards regime deserved a special mention. Safeguards agreements were implemented jointly by national bodies and the relevant segments of the Agency, and the results depended on the efficiency and coordination of the various actions. More than once, additional "unconventional" measures had brought positive results. In that regard, his

delegation welcomed the agreement concluded between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America.

124. With regard to the problems connected with the implementation of article IV of the Treaty, this country proceeded from the premise that improvements in the global non-proliferation regime should be inseparably linked to the broadening of international cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It favoured the establishment of equal partnership relations in that field on both a bilateral and a multilateral basis within the existing international export control regimes. Special attention should be paid to the situation in the developing countries and it should be easier for them to become members of the international organizations responsible for control of transfers of nuclear materials and sensitive technologies. That approach would meet the interests of each State and help to strengthen the global security system. In that context, consultations between the Nuclear Suppliers Group and nuclear recipient countries could considerably improve the climate of trust between the parties.

125. Referring to regional measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, he emphasized that the creation of new nuclear-free zones was very important for the implementation of article VII of the Treaty and could, as previous cases had shown, lead to very substantial progress. Ukraine supported the efforts of States to create nuclear-free zones in the Middle East and in Africa, because that would help to solve certain difficult international problems. It also felt that ratification by all nuclear-weapon States of the protocols to the existing treaties on nuclear-free zones and fulfilment of their treaty obligations by all parties would provide compelling proof of their adherence to the cause of non-proliferation.

126. Mr. DERYCKE (Belgium) said his delegation fully supported the statement by the representative of France on behalf of the European Union and the associated countries of central and eastern Europe.

127. The non-proliferation Treaty, which had come into force a quarter of a century previously, was designed to promote the peaceful use of atomic energy without risking the spread of nuclear weapons. His country had subscribed to the Treaty in that context and hoped it would be extended indefinitely and unconditionally.

128. The Treaty must become universal if it was to achieve its objectives. Notable progress had been made in that direction with the recent accession of new States. However, the Treaty did not cover all nuclear proliferation issues. The speedy conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and the opening of negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile materials for the production of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices constituted an essential step towards complete nuclear disarmament.

129. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, the results seemed somewhat mixed. With some exceptions, the international community could congratulate itself on the results of horizontal non-proliferation. Since 1970, few States had sought to acquire nuclear weapons and some, such as Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which had perhaps wished to do so, had not been successful, partly as a result of the treaty control mechanism. On the

other hand, in the 1970s and 1980s the nuclear payloads and delivery systems in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States had multiplied unchecked and become increasingly sophisticated. The Treaty had been inoperative because of a political and strategic context making all nuclear disarmament unlikely. The end of the cold war had enabled States to embark on the course traced by article VI by reducing their arsenals, an enterprise which Belgium hoped would be vigorously pursued.

130. However, the persistence of exacerbated nationalism and regional tensions, the accessibility of technology and terrorist designs called for an intensified struggle against military nuclear proliferation. The difficulties of transition in the former communist countries, where a high level of nuclear know-how co-existed with major economic and administrative difficulties, were a source of concern. The nuclear assistance those countries were already receiving should be reinforced in the interest of protecting the common environment.

131. In accordance with its obligations, Belgium had always opened all its nuclear installations to control by IAEA and EURATOM because it considered the rules of the guarantee systems indispensable to the security of international commerce for peaceful applications of nuclear energy. It wanted controls applied to fissile materials deriving from the dismantling of arsenals as well as to all civilian nuclear activities of the nuclear-weapon States. It should be recalled that all non-nuclear-weapon States parties were under an obligation to submit all of their nuclear installations and materials to IAEA control and could not evade that obligation even temporarily, as Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had done. Better-oriented human and financial resources should permit more efficient detection of clandestine nuclear activities. To that end, Belgium supported the ongoing reform of the IAEA control system and would like it to be universally applied.

132. The indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty was also necessary for the security of the development of the civilian nuclear industry and for international cooperation. Belgium had long encouraged international exchanges in the field of the peaceful application of nuclear energy. It had concluded agreements on scientific, industrial and technological cooperation with more than 20 States, as well as specific agreements on nuclear cooperation. Such cooperation involved sending experts to developing countries, training technicians, studying installations and supplying equipment or operational assistance. Belgium had also welcomed several hundred interns from developing countries in its research centres, medical centres and nuclear industries. It had contributed to numerous IAEA expertise and assistance missions. In the non-energy sector, it had helped to promote radio-isotopes for medical and industrial use and for the conservation of food products. It was likewise participating in the tse-tse fly eradication project. Lastly, it had made its expertise in radiological protection of the population and the environment available to those countries which had requested it. It wished to pursue and develop that international cooperation and would favour all measures that would promote it without risk of proliferation.

133. Mr. MARSCHIK (Austria) recalled that as early as 1955 his country had renounced the possession of nuclear weapons in a legally binding instrument. In 1968, it had been one of the first countries to sign and ratify the

non-proliferation Treaty. Since then, it had consistently advocated the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

134. Austria realized that that goal could not be reached in the immediate future, but considered that efforts must be made to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was essential to prevent an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States and to persuade the existing nuclear-weapon States to reduce their arsenals and refrain from developing new types of weapons. During the past 25 years, the Treaty had been the best available instrument for channelling such international endeavours.

135. The Treaty had become almost universal with regard to horizontal non-proliferation. More than 170 States had become parties to it. Austria particularly welcomed the decisions of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, which had nuclear weapons in their territories, to become non-nuclear-weapon States, as well as the decision of South Africa to abandon its nuclear capability. The Treaty had been less successful with regard to vertical non-proliferation. It could not be denied that the arsenals of the five nuclear Powers had become substantially larger since the Treaty had come into force. However, a number of disarmament measures had been taken in recent years. START I and START II, which were designed to reduce and limit offensive strategic weapons during the forthcoming decade, the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, and the nuclear-test-ban moratoria. Austria therefore believed that the Treaty had stemmed the proliferation of nuclear weapons and should be extended indefinitely. That did not mean that Austria disregarded the arguments of those who pleaded in favour of a series of limited extensions; such a procedure would make it possible to exert additional pressure on the nuclear Powers to hasten nuclear disarmament. However, that procedure would keep open the question of whether the Treaty would be a definite and permanent instrument, or merely an arrangement that could be changed or discontinued altogether after a period of time. That situation would encourage hesitant States to keep their nuclear options open, discourage the efforts of nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals and dissuade them from taking measures to ban nuclear testing. Austria was convinced that a definite and clear decision should be taken and would therefore support a decision by the Conference to extend the Treaty indefinitely and unconditionally.

136. The nuclear-weapon States should pursue their efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament. The START treaties should be implemented speedily and the three other nuclear Powers should seriously consider reducing their arsenals. Substantial progress should be made towards the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, if possible in 1995 or 1996. Austria appealed to the nuclear Powers to declare or maintain a voluntary moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests. It looked forward to the start of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It took note with satisfaction of the recent declaration by France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States reaffirming their commitment to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and placing high priority on the complete prohibition of nuclear testing.

137. Austria welcomed the work done by IAEA in the implementation of Treaty safeguards and supported ongoing efforts to strengthen the safeguards system. It would like IAEA to be given additional responsibilities in the context of future agreements and in regard to verification of nuclear materials, including fissile materials derived from nuclear disarmament.

138. In conclusion, he called on the international community to unite to lay the foundation for a future free from the threat of nuclear war, a future of peace and cooperation among all nations.

139. Mr. MONGBE (Benin) noted that 25 years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a number of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States were failing to honour the commitments they had entered into. The nuclear Powers displayed little eagerness to honour their fundamental commitments under articles IV and VI of the Treaty; certain non-nuclear-weapon States parties seemed tempted to renege on their commitments; others had not signed a safeguards agreement with IAEA committing them, inter alia, to inform the Agency of the amount of source materials available to them for various peaceful purposes. Nevertheless it should be recognized that the Treaty, notwithstanding its deficiencies, had helped to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons. A growing number of States had ratified the Treaty, and States which had the capability to acquire or which had acquired nuclear weapons had recently renounced such ambitions and had acceded to the Treaty. The universality of the Treaty had continued to increase since its entry into force.

140. The non-proliferation Treaty had been born in an international context of global rivalry in which it had been more or less feasible to control nuclear proliferation. One of the salient features of the new international context since the end of the cold war was that forces tending to promote fragmentation, for long contained by the policy of blocs, were reasserting themselves. That new development carried with it a serious risk of proliferation of all kinds of weapons, including weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons. In the circumstances and pending concerted specific measures, such as those relating to chemical weapons, for the complete elimination of a capability by States to carry out acts of aggression, it was important to maintain the non-proliferation Treaty, which, notwithstanding its defects, had helped to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Treaty being the standard applied by the international community in its condemnation of nuclear weapons, every effort should be made to avoid any development that would fail to strengthen its universality and which would substantiate the argument of those few States that refused to accede to it. Benin had thus determined to support unlimited extension of the Treaty.

141. Benin welcomed the unanimous adoption by the Security Council, on 11 April 1995, of its resolution 984 (1995) concerning security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons, but took the view that the resolution did not go far enough to dispel the legitimate fears of the non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly the weaker States. Other measures were necessary to reassure those States and guarantee their security. The States parties must thus seize the opportunity offered by the Conference to advance nuclear disarmament, promote the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, negotiate an international treaty confirming security assurances, encourage IAEA

to continue to strengthen implementation of the system of safeguards in accordance with article III of the Treaty, and, lastly, accelerate the establishment of denuclearized and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

142. Since the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity in 1964, progress had been made in that domain. Benin welcomed such progress, but supported the idea of the formulation of a binding international legal instrument, similar to those existing in other parts of the world, to strengthen the nuclear security of Africa.

143. Given the stakes for the future of the planet, Benin trusted that the Treaty would make an effective contribution to nuclear disarmament and that it would establish a foundation for more fruitful international cooperation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

144. Mr. CHINETOV (Kyrgyzstan) said that the eyes of all mankind were fixed on the Conference, which would decide an issue of supreme importance for international peace and security, namely, the extension of the non-proliferation Treaty. Respect by the nuclear Powers for their commitments under the Treaty had enabled a nuclear holocaust to be avoided. Yet the world remained exposed to the threat of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, the manufacture of which absorbed enormous human and material resources. For that reason the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty was a political act of absolute necessity at the current juncture.

145. The peaceful foreign policy of the Kyrgyz Government was intended to strengthen peace and security throughout the world and to safeguard that most precious of all things, human life. The Kyrgyz people had always been imbued with ideals of peace and friendship and good-neighbourliness towards peoples of other States. Moreover the consequences of the nuclear tests which were an integral part of the issue under consideration inspired fears in the Kyrgyz people that were fully justified.

146. For that reason, heeding the voice of good sense; aware, in common with the international community as a whole, of the problems that remained in terms of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and control of conventional weapons; stressing the importance of peaceful coexistence in a context in which local armed conflicts were likely to escalate into world confrontation; and considering that the future stability and safety of the planet could be guaranteed by respect for the non-proliferation Treaty in conjunction with a treaty imposing a complete ban on nuclear tests and the conclusion of agreements on the use of nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes, the Government of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan was firmly in favour of unconditional and indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty, and invited other States to support that position.

147. Mr. CASSAR (Malta) said that the Review and Extension Conference had been envisaged during the cold war and was taking place at a time when the international community and the United Nations were on the threshold of a new era. Yet the disappearance of confrontation between blocs had in no way diminished the need to address issues relating to non-proliferation. The Treaty

had gained quasi-universal acceptance and the concept of non-proliferation had become central to the concerns of the majority of Member States, indicating that that critical sector was not the sole domain of the nuclear-weapon States.

148. Malta was party to the non-proliferation Treaty, having deposited its instrument of ratification in 1970, only two years after it had been opened for signature. The Maltese Government had also signed a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and was considering joining IAEA as a full member.

149. The threat of a nuclear holocaust had overshadowed the international community since the invention of nuclear weapons and had been aggravated by the arms race between the nuclear super-Powers which had led them to stockpile nuclear weapons to an extent too terrible even to imagine.

150. The non-proliferation Treaty had succeeded in halting that race towards global destruction and in limiting the number of nuclear-weapon States. Perhaps by a historical coincidence the proliferation in the Member States making up the international community had occurred during the era of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Yet those new States, including Malta, barely free of colonial rule, wishing to exist in a secure international environment, had immediately acceded to the Treaty.

151. The past 25 years had also demonstrated that the ambitions of some States could not easily be ignored. That was why most smaller States wished for an unconditional and indefinite extension, a choice dictated by pragmatism as much as by the ideal of a world free from the nuclear threat. Indefinite extension would nip in the bud any ambitions to undertake a programme to develop a nuclear capability which, on the expiry of a definite period of extension, would lead to the possession of an arsenal. Only a universal Treaty could dispel the fears instilled over past decades in the minds of generations that had lived under the threat of nuclear destruction. Universality and indefinite extension were all the more necessary in that the threat of nuclear weapons was no longer employed only by States, but also by groups engaged in international terrorism.

152. The Treaty and the basic principles on which it was built (nuclear disarmament, security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and access to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes) were not the only mechanism available to the international community to ensure the success of the Conference. Bilateral and parallel track negotiations on non-proliferation had also proved successful. Negotiations in other fields relating to disarmament, such as those on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and on implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, would also have Malta's full support. Indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty would have a positive impact on other fields relating to disarmament.

153. The non-proliferation Treaty need not be viewed as a treaty for ever freezing States into two groups. It imposed a number of responsibilities on nuclear-weapon States, particularly regarding security assurances vis-à-vis non-nuclear-weapon States. Security Council resolution 984 (1995), adopted on

11 April, should make a useful contribution to the strengthening of such security assurances.

154. The non-proliferation Treaty had been the only beacon of hope in the dark period of the cold war. It would be illogical if, in an environment that was more propitious to international peace and security, the Conference failed to better the commitments undertaken 25 years earlier. Universal acceptance of an indefinite extension was the minimum result that States should envisage if they wished to bequeath the heritage of global peace and security to future generations.

155. Mr. CRVENKOVSKI (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) said that it was a great honour for him to participate in the Conference as a representative of the Republic of Macedonia which, on 30 March 1995, had become the 178th State party to the non-proliferation Treaty. Ukraine and South Africa's accession to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States was also an important step which demonstrated that it was possible to denuclearize national defence without jeopardizing national security.

156. As a non-nuclear-weapon State, the Republic of Macedonia was in favour of the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty. The Security Council's recent adoption of resolution 984 (1995) on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States that were parties to the Treaty represented, in his delegation's view, an important step towards strengthening the regime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and should contribute to the successful outcome of the Conference. At the same time, the nuclear-weapon States must pursue their negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, in particular a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control as provided in article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty.

157. The non-proliferation Treaty was the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation system, in that it enshrined all its principles; however, it must be implemented. The dramatic changes in the global situation had helped diminish any interest in nuclear weapons acquisition. Nevertheless, for the universalization of the non-proliferation regime, several conditions must be met. Comprehensive nuclear disarmament, which was on the agenda of the relevant international bodies, had not yet been accomplished. International verification was being strengthened, but the process of strengthening safeguards had not yet been completed.

158. While the prospects for the universalization of the non-proliferation regime seemed good, an improvement in the regional political climate was needed and the regional bodies should work to that end.

159. The credibility of international arms control and disarmament efforts depended to a large extent on the ability of the international community to mobilize all the States Members of the United Nations, 96 per cent of which had already acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty.

160. While small States did not feel the immediate threat of a global nuclear war, they were very much concerned about the threat that would be posed to their

security by negative developments in their immediate vicinity. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia therefore attached the greatest importance to the development of good-neighbourly relations and regarded them as the most important factor for peace, security, cooperation and efforts towards disarmament in the Balkan region.

161. At its forty-eighth session, the General Assembly had adopted without a vote resolution 48/84 B on the development of good-neighbourly relations among Balkan States. Affirming its determination that all nations should live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, the General Assembly had emphasized the urgency of the consolidation of the Balkans as a region of peace, security, stability and good-neighbourliness, thus contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia sincerely hoped that would be a significant step towards establishing a lower level of armaments and a higher level of confidence-building measures in the region.

162. No other multilateral arms control treaty in existence could match the security benefits provided by the non-proliferation Treaty under its system of accountancy and control of nuclear weapons which facilitated both verification and nuclear commerce.

163. IAEA should continue to ensure that the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were made more widely available to all the States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty.

164. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia agreed that a number of improvements were needed in the IAEA safeguards system because the current system had been designed three decades previously and, since then, States had become more accustomed to confidence-building measures in the form of international inspections. However, it was important to recognize that the creation and maintenance of political and security conditions which were conducive to non-proliferation were the most crucial elements in preventing proliferation.

165. Since there was so much at stake for current and future generations, for nuclear-weapon States and for non-nuclear-weapon States, his delegation hoped to work with all the delegations of States which were parties to the Treaty in order to achieve its indefinite and unconditional extension.

166. Mr. MORADI (Islamic Republic of Iran), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he deplored the unjustified and unsubstantiated remarks made by the representative of the United Kingdom about the Islamic Republic of Iran. It was regrettable that, since the beginning of the general debate of such an important Conference, which should help harmonize points of view, certain States were making comments which spread discord.

167. His Government's position on the export control regime was very clear. Recent events demonstrated that disagreements regarding the regime had been accentuated when a small group of supplier States, referring to "gaps" in the IAEA safeguards system, had decided unilaterally to establish regimes which did not fall within the purview of the Treaty. Taking advantage of their privileged

position as supplier States and ignoring the suspicions of the majority of States parties, they were taking secret decisions after closed debates and, curiously, were making no distinction between non-nuclear-weapon States parties and non-nuclear-weapon States which were not parties to the Treaty, thereby disregarding the inalienable right of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to have access to the peaceful applications of nuclear technology. In recent years, certain countries which controlled exports, such as the United Kingdom, which, moreover, had essentially helped create nuclear capacity in some countries, had tried to justify the discriminatory nature of the export control regime. It was time to review those erroneous principles in order to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty. The States parties to the Treaty which fulfilled their obligations should be able to exercise their inalienable right as stipulated in article IV of the Treaty and have free access to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Certain powers considered themselves to be above the law and were claiming the right to judge the intentions of others, which was in absolute contradiction with the spirit of the Treaty.

168. The PRESIDENT said that the Organization of African Unity had requested observer status at the Conference. He suggested that the request should be approved.

169. It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 7.10 p.m.

1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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1995 REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 4th MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Wednesday, 19 April 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)

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95-80706 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. NZO (South Africa) said that South Africa had played an active part in the work of the Preparatory Committee and, in response to General Assembly resolution 49/75 F, had provided a legal analysis of the extension options contained in article X, paragraph 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It was committed to a policy of non-proliferation and arms control covering all weapons of mass destruction and extending to conventional weapons. That policy was integral to its commitment to democracy, human rights, sustainable development, social justice and environmental protection.

2. The dramatic changes brought about by the end of the cold war had created the global environment in which it had been possible for the number of nuclear weapons to be reduced. The international community now had a unique opportunity to achieve the basic objectives of the Treaty. It was South Africa's fundamental belief that the Treaty should not be placed in jeopardy, and that the review and extension process should strengthen, not weaken, the non-proliferation regime. South Africa firmly believed that the security of individual countries, and of the international community as a whole, would be severely damaged if the Treaty were weakened.

3. South Africa had taken the decision to destroy its nuclear weapons and become a State party to the Treaty because it felt that its security would be guaranteed by the Treaty's provisions. Since the entry into force of the Treaty, the number of threshold States had diminished, and several countries, including South Africa, had drawn back from the nuclear-weapon option and become a part of a nuclear non-proliferation regime. Furthermore, the Treaty was the only international instrument on nuclear disarmament to which all five nuclear-weapon States were bound. Its continued existence would ensure that that commitment by nuclear-weapon States remained.

4. South Africa believed that the inequalities inherent in the Treaty, as well as the criticism of some of its provisions, should not be dealt with in such a way that they threatened the security that the Treaty provided. South Africa therefore supported the view that the Treaty should be extended indefinitely. The termination of the Treaty, whether by placing conditions on its future existence or extending it only for a fixed period, was not an acceptable option. The linkage of the Treaty to certain conditions raised the question, inter alia, of what would happen if the conditions were not met. However, there was concern that proper checks and balances should be put in place to ensure that the objectives of the Treaty were translated into reality.

5. The decision on extension should be taken only after every effort had been made to achieve the broadest possible support. Any decision taken by a simple majority would weaken the Treaty and undermine the commitment of those left on the outside. While a consensus decision would be ideal, the decision must be taken by a significant majority, which would need to include key countries from across group boundaries.

6. A mechanism must be found to address the concerns expressed about the implementation of the Treaty. The review process provided for in article VIII should be strengthened. That could be done by adopting a set of principles for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament which would set out the general obligations and goals which States parties would strive for, taking into account the prevailing international environment. The principles would not constitute an amendment to the Treaty; commitment to them would be renewed at every review to ensure that they were dynamic and corresponded to changing international circumstances. They would not be conditions which could lead to the termination of the Treaty, but a yardstick by which all States parties could measure their achievement.

7. The following broad issues should be taken into account when formulating the principles: restatement of the commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; strengthening of and full adherence to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard agreements; access to nuclear material and technology for peaceful purposes; progress in the negotiations on a treaty on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, the reduction of nuclear arsenals and negotiations for the establishment of a comprehensive test-ban treaty; commitment to the establishment of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, and the enforcement of binding security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

8. South Africa proposed that a committee should be established - either open-ended or consisting of a representative group of countries - which would be responsible for studying the review process and making concrete recommendations on how to improve and strengthen the review conference mechanism. The report on its recommendations should be submitted for the consideration of all States parties, possibly at an additional Preparatory Committee session prior to the review conference in the year 2000. The Preparatory Committee should then be responsible for including those improvements in the agenda and programme of work of the next review conference.

9. South Africa had a number of initial suggestions which could be considered by such a committee. It believed that the basic structure of the review conferences should be retained, but that subcommittees of the three main committees should be established in order to take up specific issues falling within the ambit of the Treaty provisions which were being considered by the parent main committee. It proposed the adoption of a set of principles for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and the establishment of an open-ended committee which would meet at fixed intervals during the period between review conferences and consider specific ways of strengthening all aspects of the Treaty and the non-proliferation regime.

10. South Africa agreed that the disarmament provisions contained in article VI were essential for the effective implementation of the Treaty. It welcomed the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I) and the Treaty on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) and believed that steps should be taken to accelerate the pace of nuclear disarmament and achieve the earliest possible conclusion of a START III agreement. Consideration should also be given to including the arsenals of the other nuclear-weapon States in the process. South Africa welcomed the security

assurances embodied in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and in the statements made in the Security Council by the five nuclear-weapon States. However, it remained convinced that the most effective way to address the issue was the negotiation, by all the States parties, of an international agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties. South Africa believed that nuclear-weapon-free zones gave an added dimension to the security provided by the Treaty. It was an active supporter of an African nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty and would be hosting the next meeting of the Group of Experts preparing the text for such a treaty.

11. With regard to article III, South Africa supported the principle of strengthened safeguards as well as the work that was being done by IAEA. It had been participating in field trials and in principle supported the idea of including environmental monitoring as an integral part of the safeguards system, but needed time to obtain an opinion on the legal implications of such a system, as well as more information on the cost implications. It urged greater transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapon States; that would help allay concerns and suspicions regarding the manner in which they were meeting their responsibilities under the Treaty.

12. With regard to article IV, South Africa was participating in the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme and was strongly in favour of the exchange of technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy between the developed and developing world, based on the concept of sustainable development. South Africa was currently a host country for the training of scientists and technicians from Africa. It had supported the establishment by IAEA of a Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Cooperation (SAGTAC), and believed that SAGTAC should convene a meeting of all interested parties, particularly the developing countries, to discuss specific problem areas in the field of nuclear technology transfer. South Africa, with its extensive nuclear infrastructure and competencies, was also participating actively in many projects in Africa under the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology; it would strongly support greater levels of involvement on the part of the developed world in the transfer of peaceful nuclear technologies to the developing world, and especially to Africa.

13. Democratic South Africa saw international and regional security being achieved by complete nuclear disarmament. The South African experience - that security was provided by nuclear disarmament rather than by nuclear proliferation - was significant, not only for the threshold States, but also for the acknowledged nuclear-weapon States. South Africa believed that, with the necessary political will, it was possible to create a world free of nuclear weapons.

14. Ms. HALONEN (Finland) said that the Conference had a momentous decision to take which would have a lasting impact on international peace and security. The Conference should once and for all remove any uncertainty about the permanence of the Treaty. Finland had joined the Treaty because it saw it as contributing to its national security and economic development. It had no regrets.

15. The Treaty had stood the test of time; it had become a global norm, upheld by the vast majority of the States. Even those States which might harbour nuclear-weapon ambitions were not willing to say so publicly. When non-compliance had been established beyond the shadow of a doubt, as in the case of Iraq, the international community had upheld the Treaty with determination. When compliance had been and was in doubt, as in the case of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the international community needed to insist that the doubts be removed to its satisfaction.

16. Important work had been initiated by IAEA to strengthen its role in verifying the non-existence of undeclared nuclear activities. Finland was a strong supporter of "Programme 93+2", and believed that the Conference should support the measures called for in that programme. Finland had accepted IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear activities, both current and future. It also required acceptance of full-scope safeguards by any non-nuclear-weapon recipient of nuclear transfers from its territory. The Conference should urge those few suppliers which did not yet do so to require such a condition without delay. That condition derived from the general obligation under the Treaty not to assist in any way in the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

17. The non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had a legitimate right to assurances against nuclear aggression. Finland therefore welcomed the unanimous adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995). For Finland, as a non-nuclear-weapon State, the ultimate goal remained the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Indefinite extension of the Treaty would provide the necessary framework for renewed efforts towards nuclear disarmament. Article VI would become a permanent obligation. Indefinite extension would also send a clear message to those few States that still remained outside the Treaty that the Treaty was permanent and that to remain outside was to remain in the cold. The Treaty was there also to help if a non-State party decided to change its mind. South Africa had shown that it could be done. Finland hoped that India, Israel and Pakistan would also become States parties. Finland welcomed the recent steps towards the consolidation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, as well as the progress made towards the denuclearization of Africa.

18. The nuclear-arms race was over; the threat of a global nuclear war had receded beyond the horizon. The Conference should recognize that historic change. The number of nuclear weapons was rapidly decreasing. Finland urged rapid withdrawal from operational use of all the remaining tactical nuclear weapons and their subsequent elimination. A comprehensive and verifiable nuclear-test-ban treaty would complement other efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. That treaty must ban all nuclear explosions. The technological hopes of the 1960s that nuclear explosions could be used for peaceful purposes had turned out to be misguided; there was no justification for conducting such explosions. The Conference should note that article V was in fact a dead letter; that would benefit the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. There was also an urgent need for a multilateral ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes so as to cap the bomb-making ability not only of the five nuclear-weapon States but also of those which still remained outside the Treaty.

19. Mr. GORE (United States of America) said that, like those who had gathered 50 years earlier to create the United Nations, the international community was assembled at a moment of unusual opportunity and great risk. The confrontation between the United States and the former Soviet Union had ended, and their Governments had put behind them a relationship based on a nuclear balance of terror, profoundly diminishing but not eliminating the risk of nuclear war.

20. The struggle to block the proliferation of nuclear weapons had entered a critical phase. The knowledge and capacity to build nuclear weapons was increasingly available, and although most countries had recognized that the acquisition of nuclear weapons would bring greater insecurity and danger, the few seeking them had an increasing possibility of succeeding. The diminishing risk that nuclear war would be caused by one rivalry was offset by an increasing risk that it would be caused by others.

21. At the time of its creation, the Treaty had represented a delicate balance between competing and seemingly irreconcilable interests. After a quarter century of experience, it must be determined whether the cause of peace was best served by continuing the Treaty under temporary arrangements, or by using the one-time option to give it a permanent basis by supporting its indefinite extension without conditions.

22. The case for indefinite extension could be stated succinctly. The Treaty created a more secure world for all its members, nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. By providing an internationally recognized, verifiable means for States to forswear nuclear weapons forever, the Treaty helped to prevent regional rivalries from evolving into arms races. By making it possible for the vast majority of the world's nations to remain non-nuclear without jeopardizing their security, the Treaty reinforced the global stability that was a necessary foundation for progress in arms control and disarmament.

23. The principal arguments directed against indefinite extension were that the Treaty was inherently discriminatory, that the nuclear-weapon States had failed to live up to their commitments under article VI, that indefinite extension would free the nuclear-weapon States from further pressure to disarm, that the Treaty exposed non-nuclear States to intimidation by nuclear-weapon States and States not party to the Treaty, and that it would destroy the capacity of the agreement to be adapted to future circumstances.

24. The Treaty had recognized an initial division of States between those possessing nuclear weapons and those pledged not to acquire them, but it did not create a permanent class of nuclear-weapon States. Rather, those States had a binding legal obligation under article VI to pursue negotiations in good faith on arms control and disarmament. Indefinite extension would ensure the permanence of that obligation and create the conditions for its ultimate achievement. Some also argued that the nuclear-weapon States had failed to live up to their commitments under article VI, but the evidence strongly supported the case that they were moving in the direction prescribed by their obligations under the Treaty. The United States and Russia, under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) had eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. The combined results of the START I and START II Treaties would be a two-thirds reduction in the nuclear arsenals of those two countries.

They had also agreed not to target their remaining nuclear missiles. In addition, the United States had stopped producing fissile materials for nuclear explosives, and had launched a new global effort to halt their production anywhere in the world. In 1994, the United States had for the first time submitted weapons material from its stockpile to IAEA safeguards. To propel further the effort to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty, the United States had extended its moratorium on nuclear tests, and a previous proposal for a ten-year withdrawal provision had been withdrawn. If the Conference on Disarmament was successful, it was possible that the United States had already conducted its last nuclear test. He paid tribute to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, which had become parties to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, as had South Africa, which had rid itself of its nuclear weapons in order to join the Treaty.

25. Rather than indefinite extension, some argued that the best way to ensure that the nuclear-weapon States moved towards disarmament was to subject it to periodic live-or-die votes, or by extending it with conditions. Yet there were serious flaws in that argument. It was worth noting that even a review period of 25 years was well within the service lifetime of a major nuclear weapons system. In practical effect, rolling periods of review could have the same consequences as an immediate decision to terminate the Treaty. Making the Treaty subject to periodic risk would encourage States which aspired to nuclear weapons to hold their options in reserve, rather than to accept the permanence of their obligations under the Treaty.

26. Nuclear-weapon States clearly understood that damaging the NPT also damaged their own security, and thus had strong motives to refrain from nuclear threats and instead to provide credible assurances designed to allay the concerns of others. In fact, the United States and the other four nuclear-weapon States had just provided positive and negative security assurances to the international community. In addition, the success of the NPT built a barrier against nuclear threats by establishing a global norm of non-proliferation. In response to the argument that indefinite extension would destroy its ability to meet changing circumstances, radical changes had taken place in the world in recent years which the Treaty had handled without difficulty. Furthermore, reserves of flexibility were built into the procedures for review and amendment, and would not be altered by a decision to extend it indefinitely and without conditions.

27. In an era in which super-Power confrontation had been replaced by cooperation to eliminate nuclear arms, but in which the dangers of nuclear proliferation were increasingly apparent, the Treaty remained central to the cause of peace. He called for support of the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty, because it was deeply in the security interests of all.

28. Legislative bodies throughout the world, in ratifying the Treaty, had accepted that they would be bound by a decision made by the majority of the parties. Any suggestion that the decision might be made through a secret ballot undermined the confidence placed in those legislative bodies. Nations which called for accountability must accept its burdens. The United States strongly rejected any notion that the decisions of the Conference could not stand the light of day, and called on all countries to take responsibility for their actions.

29. The international community had learned what those who were present at the creation of the atomic age could only hope: that proliferation could be halted, and that nations could work together to protect their mutual security. There could be no rest until those goals, and the Treaty, became enduring realities.

30. Mr. KABARITI (Jordan) said that, in reflecting on the achievements and future goals of the NPT after 25 years, the Treaty had succeeded in preventing an increase in the number of declared nuclear-weapon States, although certain States had been able to escape the controls of the international non-proliferation regime and produce nuclear weapons. It had also succeeded in promoting the renunciation of the production and development of nuclear weapons and in portraying any State which sought to acquire such weapons as an international outlaw. The Treaty had linked the question of proliferation with increased danger of nuclear war, and had drawn attention to the dangers of a regional arms race. It had provided the IAEA safeguards system with the legal authority to carry out its tasks, as well.

31. The impossibility of achieving complete nuclear disarmament, as it appeared at the end of the 1960s, had not discouraged the international community from seeking to achieve that goal. The horizontal non-proliferation of nuclear weapons had been considered a temporary solution to that dilemma, but the ultimate aim of the Treaty was complete nuclear disarmament. The reasons why complete nuclear disarmament, and even the less ambitious goal of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, had not been achieved, should be explored.

32. The obligations imposed on nuclear States by article VI were clear. The first, i.e. the cessation of the nuclear arms race, had been achieved between the two super-Powers following the end of the cold war, but not at the regional level. The emergence of so-called threshold States had aggravated the problem because such States presented a strong incentive to neighbouring States to acquire nuclear weapons. Fulfilment of the second obligation under article VI, i.e. overall nuclear disarmament, was still distant despite progress achieved bilaterally between the two super-Powers; more distant still was general and complete disarmament, the third obligation under article VI. While Jordan viewed with satisfaction the moratorium on nuclear tests by four of the five nuclear powers, it considered that neither the nuclear-test moratorium nor a binding treaty, if achieved, would fulfil the obligation of the nuclear powers under the Treaty to undertake general and complete nuclear disarmament. Accordingly, Jordan hoped for the early finalization of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, to be followed by other steps towards that ultimate goal.

33. Jordan noted with deep appreciation the services offered by the IAEA in the area of provision of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes to non-nuclear States. It called upon those States that possessed nuclear technology to enable the Agency to overcome existing obstacles to providing nuclear energy to developing countries for peaceful uses and to the efficient and effective implementation of the safeguards system.

34. The refusal of some States possessing nuclear capabilities to accede to the Treaty reduced its efficacy as well as the commitment of States parties to fully implement its provisions. For example, Israel had consistently refused to

accede to the Treaty for the past quarter century, despite other recent successes in the Middle East peace process. Israel's accession to the Treaty and placement of all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards would help achieve such positive results as preventing the occurrence of potentially disastrous nuclear accidents, accelerating negotiations within the framework of the Arms Control and Regional Security Group, enhancing the progress of and building confidence in other parts of the peace process in general, mitigating the regional arms race to foster economic and social development in the region, and bolstering the universality of the Treaty by encouraging other States not parties to accede to it. Jordan believed it would be very difficult to convince the peoples in the region of Israel's credibility, seriousness and desire for a just, durable and comprehensive peace in the Middle East if Israel continued its intransigence and refusal to accede to the Treaty or place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

35. Israel's accession to the Treaty would also pave the way towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the region, in accordance with the numerous General Assembly resolutions to that effect adopted over the previous two decades. However, those resolutions had yet to be implemented, and the nuclear powers had a major responsibility for establishing such zones both in the Middle East and in the world at large. To date, only the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga had been concluded to establish such zones in inhabited areas, although a treaty to establish such a zone in Africa was about to be opened for signature.

36. The security assurances given to the non-nuclear-weapon States in compensation for their renunciation of the nuclear option did not provide those States with sufficient security. Rather, what were required were comprehensive, legally binding and unconditional security assurances, both positive and negative, along the lines of the non-use and non-first use of nuclear weapons. The role of the Security Council in that regard extended to monitoring of the implementation of Treaty provisions and the even-handed prevention of further nuclear-weapons proliferation. However, the Treaty lacked implementation machinery or sanctions regimes, relying for those functions on the IAEA and the Charter of the United Nations respectively. It was therefore imperative that the Conference should concentrate on finding solutions to those shortcomings in the Treaty before considering the question of extending it. While reaffirming the utmost importance of the Treaty's continuing to play its vital role, Jordan also reaffirmed the need for the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty by:

(1) Intensifying their efforts to achieve a general and complete nuclear disarmament, by concluding a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and a treaty banning the production of fissile material;

(2) Making additional efforts to provide nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to non-nuclear States;

(3) Working to provide comprehensive, legally binding and effective security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon States, and working towards a treaty committing the nuclear powers to the non-use and non-first use of nuclear weapons;

(4) Securing the universality of the Treaty by exercising pressure on States with nuclear capability like Israel that remained outside the Treaty framework and ending regional nuclear-arms races;

(5) Enhancing the role of the Security Council in observing the Treaty implementation and even-handedly promoting its universality;

(6) Supporting the effectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency by enhancing its system of guarantees and increasing its human and financial resources; and

(7) Encouraging the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones throughout the world, with priority for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East in order to avoid the dangers to the peace process posed by the presence there of nuclear weapons.

37. Jordan was motivated by its commitment to achieving peace and consolidating stability and security in the Middle East and the world at large. As the main pillar of the international non-proliferation regime, the Treaty required review and constructive criticism from time to time in order to strengthen it and ensure its universality.

38. Mr. MWAMBULUKUTU (United Republic of Tanzania) said that Tanzania had always regarded the Treaty as an important instrument for arms control, and was aware of the significant role it had played in discouraging horizontal proliferation. However, the nuclear-weapon States had failed to fully meet their obligations under article VI in the area of progress towards total nuclear disarmament. Tanzania welcomed the call of the United Nations Secretary-General for the reduction and destruction of all nuclear weapons and the means to make them. The past 25 years had witnessed an unprecedented nuclear arms race, with the majority of those weapons having been deployed after the Treaty came into force in 1970. Other risks remained as well, such as those of weapons-grade material falling into the wrong hands, as well as of nuclear accidents. The international community was responsible for ensuring that such leakages did not lead to unbridled proliferation.

39. The Treaty itself had fundamental shortcomings which compromised its effective functioning, as for example its failure to address the imbalance between the nuclear States, with their stockpiled arsenals, and the non-nuclear States, which had voluntarily given up any ambition to acquire nuclear capability. Non-nuclear States had further expressed their commitment to nuclear disarmament in their decisions to voluntarily establish nuclear-weapons-free zones in various regions of the world.

40. Another area of great concern to the majority of States parties was the imbalance between nuclear and non-nuclear States in the application of the safeguards regime provided for under article III; such safeguards should also not be used as a pretext for denying States parties access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

41. Tanzania paid tribute to the vital role of the IAEA in implementing the Treaty, and called for its resources to be increased so that it could fulfil its

responsibilities in channelling the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology and for assistance to developing countries. Tanzania was indebted to the IAEA for its technical assistance and promotion of regional cooperation ventures through the African Regional Cooperative Agreement (AFRA).

42. To date, efforts to provide security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States had fallen short of the legally binding instrument those States required, in which nuclear-weapon States would reaffirm the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. However, Tanzania looked forward to the conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and continued to view that Treaty as a cornerstone for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

43. Tanzania was strongly of the view that continuing with the Treaty in its present form was to perpetuate the inequalities inherent in it, and to legitimize the existence of deadly weapons in the hands of the few. Unconditional and indefinite extension of the Treaty was surely not a viable option if the past was to determine the future; any decision on extension of the Treaty should reflect the interests of the powerful and less-powerful alike.

44. Mr. AL-SHARA' (Syrian Arab Republic) said that the Treaty was not an end in itself, but rather a step towards limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and towards their total eradication. However, in the first 25 years of its operation, the Treaty had not succeeded in ridding the world of nuclear weapons; nor had the nuclear States parties lived up to their commitments to eradicate nuclear weapons, prevent their proliferation, or even to assist non-nuclear States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Some of the nuclear-weapon States parties had even obstructed the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology to non-nuclear-weapon States parties, which had abided by its provisions, while channelling sophisticated technology to Israel, which had steadfastly refused to sign the Treaty. That in turn had paved the way for Israel's acquisition of military nuclear capabilities, in contravention of the letter and spirit of the Treaty.

45. Syria believed that the international community had a unique opportunity to undertake a comprehensive review of the Treaty, to set up machinery that would guarantee the eradication of nuclear weapons and their manufacture, and destroy stockpiles of such weapons throughout the world. His country believed that the Treaty would remain unable to achieve its objectives as long as all the States of the world without exception did not accede to it and abide by its provisions. Adherence to the Treaty was even more crucial at the regional level. In that regard, it was unreasonable to require the Arab States of the Middle East region, who had proved their commitment to the Treaty for over a quarter of a century, to extend it unconditionally and indefinitely while Israel, which was known to have a military nuclear programme, refused to accede to it. Moreover, Israel not only categorically sidestepped the requirements of a comprehensive peace with its immediate neighbours, but consistently thwarted any efforts to achieve such a peace and strenuously objected to the legitimate right of any State in the region to develop a peaceful nuclear programme under international inspection and control.

46. In a resolution adopted unanimously by the Council of the League of Arab States, Syria and all the Arab States had expressed their deep concern at that

critical situation in the region. The resolution had stressed inter alia that the entrenchment of the status quo whereby all the States of the Middle East with the exception of Israel were committed to the non-proliferation system constituted a dangerous and unacceptable balance that threatened the region's security and stability.

47. Syria had remained faithful to its obligations under the Treaty and on different occasions had made positive contributions to the promotion of stability and security in the region. At the Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons in 1989 it had put forward an initiative to rid the Middle East region of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction under the auspices of the United Nations. Proceeding from its concern for the security and stability of the region, Syria could not agree to the extension of the Treaty unless Israel acceded to it and subjected its nuclear installations to international inspection. That position did not emanate from a wish or intention to set aside the objectives of the Treaty but rather from Syria's categorical rejection of the presence of nuclear weapons in the Middle East without any genuine international efforts being made to eliminate such weapons. Furthermore, had the Conference suspended its activities for a reasonable period of time to try to make all possible efforts to arrive at an international consensus which would help to remove the loopholes in the Treaty and ensure both its effectiveness and universality by obtaining the accession of all the States of the world to it without exception, Syria would not have objected to its extension.

48. Syria nevertheless remained committed to the achievement of a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East region as well as to the universality of the non-proliferation Treaty.

49. Mr. GODAL (Norway) said that the threat of nuclear war no longer derived from super-Power rivalry in a bipolar world but from the spread of nuclear weapons and associated technologies, material and expertise to areas of political tension and internal unrest. In the view of the Norwegian Government, the non-proliferation Treaty was the most important instrument at the international community's disposal in the efforts to counter that threat. While no other multilateral arms control agreement had obtained the support of so many countries, he none the less believed that the most serious drawback of the Treaty, as the only legally binding instrument of global application in the field of nuclear arms control and disarmament, was that it did not have a permanent status.

50. In his Government's view, the Treaty should be extended indefinitely and be granted unlimited duration for a number of important reasons. It served as a barrier against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and held out the promise of a world free of nuclear weapons. It was an instrument for assessing and influencing the disarmament efforts undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States in accordance with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty. The review mechanism would continue to be an integral and vital part of the Treaty once a decision on extension had been taken. Uncertainty as to the future of the Treaty could easily weaken the effect of those systematic reviews. Uncertainty concerning the duration of the Treaty could also have a negative effect on the will of the nuclear-weapon States to implement further disarmament measures.

Indefinite extension of the Treaty would reinforce the global non-nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-proliferation norm. Extending it for a short fixed period would send a signal to would-be proliferators that the international community was no longer seeking the indefinite prevention of nuclear proliferation, but some lesser goal.

51. While a non-proliferation treaty of indefinite duration was not sufficient to ensure total nuclear disarmament, giving the Treaty permanent legal status provided the best possible framework for a continuation of efforts towards a world free from the threat of nuclear weapons. In that regard, rapid progress was needed on a number of interrelated issues which included the need for all nuclear Powers to reconfirm their commitment to the aim of a nuclear-free world and a firm commitment on the part of such Powers to abstain from the threat of use or the use of nuclear weapons against States which did not possess such weapons. A comprehensive ban on all nuclear testing had been a priority arms control issue for the Norwegian Government for many years and negotiations in that regard should be speeded up. In his opinion, the notion of nuclear explosions for so-called peaceful purposes should be rejected. Norway also believed that concrete steps must be taken to establish a regime that would include declarations of stockpiles of all weapons-grade materials accompanied by other appropriate transparency measures, while more effective measures should be agreed upon for registering, managing and monitoring existing stocks of plutonium in order to address the growing international concern about the illegal transfer and smuggling of nuclear material of weapons-grade quality. The safe and secure storage and handling of fissile material was also a matter of urgency if further environmental degradation was to be prevented from following in the wake of a comprehensive disarmament process. Norway welcomed the efforts under the auspices of IAEA to draw up an international convention on the safety of radioactive waste management.

52. The end of the cold war had uncovered large-scale military related environmental damage of an inherently cross-border character, affecting entire regions and spanning several countries. The question of how to allocate sufficient resources to deal with those challenges was a matter of urgency.

53. The current downgrading of the role of nuclear weapons in international affairs was of paramount importance. His Government therefore welcomed the political will in the United States and the Russian Federation to seek an agreement on further reductions and limitations of strategic forces beyond the stipulations of the START II Treaty and the will on the part of the British and French authorities to implement further reductions. The fact that non-nuclear-weapon States de-emphasized the importance of a nuclear deterrent to national security not only reduced the role of nuclear weapons as such but should also influence the thinking of other States on that issue.

54. Preventing proliferation was a matter of political will to which the non-proliferation regime as a whole contributed. The first and most important barrier to proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction was an international political order which made those weapons meaningless. International cooperation to resolve regional and local conflicts was indispensable and should therefore be seen in the context of non-proliferation. Confidence-building measures could help to improve relations

between States by replacing distrust, tension and uncertainty with confidence, stability and cooperation.

ELECTION OF CHAIRMEN AND VICE-CHAIRMEN OF THE MAIN COMMITTEES, THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE AND THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE (continued) (agenda item 8)

55. The PRESIDENT said that Mr. Rajab Sukayri (Jordan) had been nominated for the post of Vice-Chairman of Main Committee II, Mr. Gustavo Alvarez Goyoaga (Uruguay) for the post of Vice-Chairman of Main Committee III and Mr. Nabil Fahmy (Egypt) for the post of Vice-Chairman of the Drafting Committee. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to approve the nominations.

56. It was so decided.

ELECTION OF VICE-PRESIDENTS (agenda item 9)

57. The PRESIDENT announced the following nominations for the posts of Vice-President: for the Group of Eastern European and Other States: Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic and Ukraine; for the Group of Western European and Other States: Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States of America; for the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States: Algeria, Bangladesh, Cameroon, the People's Republic of China, the Congo, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania and Venezuela. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to approve the nominations.

58. It was so decided.

APPOINTMENT OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE (agenda item 10 (a))

59. The PRESIDENT proposed Armenia, Germany, Italy, Lesotho, Lithuania and Myanmar as members of the Credentials Committee. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference agreed with the proposal.

60. It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.